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Abstract 
This paper focuses on labor market policies across countries belonging to the 
social-democratic welfare state regime. Since 1980 Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden have undergone a number of reforms and modifications within labor 
market, which identify the shift from traditional politics of expansion towards 
what many refer to as welfare retrenchment or restructuring. This paper attempts 
to observe how the Nordic states have reformed their labor market policies and to 
understand to what extent the partisan shade of government can explain their 
reform activity. In order to assess the dynamics of labor market policies across the 
social-democratic welfare regime, the paper utilizes the concept of path 
dependency, power resource theory, Nixon-goes-to-China argument and insider-
outsider theory. The results of the study show that labor market policies across 
Scandinavian states have undergone a number of changes: the provision of 
unemployment insurance has decreased, while the expenditure on employment 
incentives has increased in various degrees, depending on the analyzed country. 
The paper argues that the labor market reform activity which has taken place in 
countries belonging to social-democratic welfare regime is to be explained by 
parties’ vote-seeking strategy, rather than ideological preferences, pursued by 
parties. Furthermore, such reforms are uncovered by external factors, such as 
economic constraints and unemployment, which stimulate insider-outsider 
preferences dilemma, and thus push parties to undertake specific measures. 
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1 Introduction 
In one of its recent articles on the Nordic countries, The Economist skillfully adapted Cecil 
Rhodes’ remark that “to be born an Englishman is to win the first prize in the lottery of life” 
to the context of being born Nordic (2013). Indeed, one can claim that not only have the 
Scandinavian states largely succeeded in dealing with economic constraints still apparent in 
Europe, they have also remained committed to social equality (Valkonen and Vihriälä 
2014:48). While this image of Nordic countries is still prevalent among many (including 
worldwide organizations, scholars, and mass media), others believe that the praised model is 
facing mounting challenges, specifically within its labor market sector.  
 
1.1 Problematization of research question 
There are some general characteristics associated with the concept of Scandinavian welfare 
states. Since the 1930s they have been hailed as an exceptional case in worldwide political 
affairs, making up both political science studies and comparative welfare state research 
(Christiansen 2006:9). Undeniably, the notion of the Nordic model has developed into a 
customary term for the states uniting substantial welfare state privileges with ongoing 
economic development, low levels of unemployment and increasingly great labor force 
participation, above all among women (ibid). The states appeared to have succeeded in 
combining the notions of social equality and economic competitiveness; and as recently as in 
1988, Sweden, Norway and Finland still performed as worldwide guardians of upholding low 
unemployment and expanding welfare state provisions (Stephens 1995:1).  Moreover, the 
presence and the essential increase of the entitlements in the previous decade is often stated to 
be a reason behind these countries’ success in attaining minor degrees of unemployment 
(ibid).  
Nevertheless, the Nordic model has not been without problems. Denmark became the first 
state, characterized by years of growing unemployment and the linked economic difficulties. 
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Soon enough, all associates to the Nordic model had witnessed the formerly unfamiliar 
upsurges in unemployment rates (Andersen 2008:34).  
Various scholars have connected the development of economic challenges within the Nordic 
model largely to its welfare states rather than external factors like economic crisis or 
globalization. These scholars argue that the generous citizen rights and social insurances 
come at a very high cost and, thus, contribute to the inability of the Scandinavian economies 
to compete globally (Stephens 1995:1). One of the greatest challenges faced by the Nordics is 
growing unemployment, which has caused states to reconsider entitlements, specifically when 
it comes to unemployment insurance and other related provisions. During this 
reconsideration, the coverage against redundancy occupied the states’ attention as it in reality 
remained a significant component of the universal welfare and social insurance system. 
However, in recent years, the settlement of benefit retrenchment (including the reduction of 
replacement rates and the introduction of benefits waiting periods) has been robustly 
discussed among political actors across advanced capitalist societies as a substantial shift 
from the Nordic labor market strategy (ibid). Moreover, the critical outlook towards the 
Nordic model seems to have established partial acceptance even among the principal welfare 
state constituents in the countries: the Social Democrats and trade unions (ibid).  
These recent changes in regards to labor market strategies have stimulated an enormous 
attention within social science academia for a number of reasons. Firstly, the notion of the 
welfare state is “a highly important phenomenon” in advanced capitalist societies, strongly 
influencing the life of just about the whole populace of the Western world (Green-Pedersen 
2002:13). Secondly, investigating the development of modern welfare states has been 
lastingly associated with studying their expansion, whereas the changes in social insurance 
provision across countries have in fact proven the opposite (ibid). 
1.2 The aim, research question and the scope 
The main aim of this paper is to establish how the labor market policies in Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden changed throughout the period from 1980s until 2015. Labor market 
policies are divided into two categories: unemployment insurance provision and employment 
incentives expenditures, which are treated as dependent variables. The study is specifically 
interested in cut-backs of passive and benefit-based unemployment policies and spendings on 
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active labor market measures, as they reflect what many scholars believe to be the shift from 
traditional politics of expansion in Scandinavian welfare states (Clayton and Pontusson 
1998:67; Pierson 1996:143-45). The additional aim of the paper is to analyze how such 
changes in entitlements provision and spending might be affected by partisan politics in each 
state. 
The case selection of the study excludes Iceland and, accordingly, the paper utilizes Esping-
Andersen’s concept of social-democratic welfare regime instead of the Nordic model. Despite 
its social-democratic grounds, the welfare system of this country is “smaller, less costly, less 
generous, and less redistributive than other Scandinavian welfare systems” (Ólafsson 
2005:214). Nevertheless, as later discussed in the paper, the concept of the Nordic model is 
tightly integrated and shares similar characteristics with what is now known to be the social-
democratic welfare state regime. Developed by the Danish scholar Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 
the notion of the welfare state regime corresponds to the typology of the welfare states by 
their nature and distinct features that would position them into various clusters. The 
fundament of each regime rests upon three variables, namely the notions of 
decommodification, stratification and the relationship between state, family and market, 
which will be further discussed in the background section of the paper. These concepts 
consequently divide welfare states into three represented types: liberal (low 
decommodification and stratification, encouragement of the market), conservative (low 
decommodification and high stratification, traditional family-hood preservation) and social-
democratic (high decommodification and low stratification, prominent role of state in welfare 
delivery) welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990:26-29). The social-democratic welfare 
states lie in the focus of the study as they are claimed to be more dependent on government 
and party composition structures, and have large and expensive public sector and dominating 
principle of universalism (Christiansen 2006:11). 
As such, this study focuses on answering the following two-folded research question: How 
have countries within Esping-Andersen’s social-democratic welfare state regime reformed 
their labor market policies over the last 35 years? To what extent does the partisan shade of 
government explain their reform activity? 
In order to empirically examine the recent developments within the social-democratic welfare 
cluster, this study utilizes the provision of employment-related transfers and services (further 
referred to as labor market policies), which include the unemployment insurance and the 
employment incentives expenditures. These provisions make up significant facets of the 
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Scandinavian social security system and can play a crucial role in combatting unemployment 
and economic insecurities (Howell and Azizoglu 2011:4).They are therefore key components 
in assessing what route of development the social-democratic welfare states pursue. Notably, 
the unemployment insurance is applied as a passive approach towards labor market policies, 
whereas expenditures on employment incentives signify an important share of active labor 
market policies (ALMPs).   
This thesis analyzes the major changes that the labor market policies have undergone for the 
last 35 years. Furthermore, it aims to assess the role of partisan politics behind the related 
reform activity. In order to do so, the study will make use of the path dependency concept, 
power resource theory, the Nixon-goes-to-China argument and the insider-outsider theory, 
which represent the long-time predominant trends in addressing the role of political actors 
when responding to a range of pressures on welfare states. The contrasting concepts and 
approaches are used as the theoretical grounds to access the degree and the nature of labor 
market policy changes.  
 
1.3 Motivation 
The motivation behind choosing Scandinavian countries as a representative case rests upon a 
number of concerns. Firstly, the existence of detailed and accessible data on social insurance 
programs in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden contributes to paper’s validity and 
reliability criteria. Secondly, the Scandinavian welfare states have often been accused to be 
under threat when taking into account their belonging to a distinct labor market regime 
(Stephens 1995:8). Indeed, one can claim that much has changed since Esping-Andersen 
introduced Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, but do the retrenchment dynamics really 
signify the crisis in the welfare state development and, thus, pose a threat to social-democratic 
welfare cluster as a distinct regime? Lastly, Scandinavian unions claim the highest union 
density rates among industrial societies and are extremely centralized, which allows for 
testing of main projections of power resource theory, weighting them with the alternative 
Nixon-goes-to-China and insider-outsider frameworks and ,thus, accessing the role of partisan 
politics within the Nordic model. 
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The study, thus, contributes to already existent knowledge through a number of channels. 
Firstly, it re-examines the main notions of the already recognized social-democratic regime, 
thus, questioning how the current characteristics of Esping-Andersen’s typology can clarify 
the mechanism of change within labor market policies. Hence, the paper helps to establish 
possible patterns across social-democratic welfare states, depending on their political system 
composition, namely the dominating parties in power. Secondly, it supplements the ways one 
can understand the long-term delivery of the unemployment insurance and stimulation of 
employment incentives, as well as the role of interest groups in it. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the concept of 
the Nordic model of welfare, how it is reflected in Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime 
classification, the main notions and characteristics connected to the social-democratic welfare 
regime and the review of previous research and literature on the issue of change within the 
Nordic model. Section 3 outlines the comparative historical analysis research method used in 
the study, defines the major data sources, variables and case selection. Section 4 arranges for 
the comprehensive theoretical perspectives the thesis is based on, namely the path 
dependency concept, the power resource, insider-outsider theories and Nixon-goes-to-China 
argument, followed by hypothesis formulation. Subsequently, section 5 covers the analysis of 
the study results in accordance to the presented operationalization of the variables. The 
chapter is further supported by the empirical framework and analysis of the outcomes across 
each country belonging to social-democratic welfare state regime. Finally, Section 6 
concludes and provides suggestions for the further research. 
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2 Background 
The notion of a ‘Nordic or Scandinavian model’ or ‘welfare regime type’ has successfully 
been used to mainly describe the social and economic models of Nordic states, namely 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Alestalo, Hort and Kuhnle 2009:1). 
Contrasting other European societies, the Nordics, with some exceptions in Iceland, share the 
combination of common fundamental principles. They might deal with welfare provision in 
different ways, but the resemblances between the states are sufficient enough to establish a 
recognizable and distinct Nordic model of welfare (The Nordic Council 2015). This section 
briefly presents the central characteristics of the Nordic model, connects them to Esping-
Andersen’s classification of welfare states and illuminates some important labor market and 
political differences between the states that make up the discussed cluster. Furthermore, the 
section outlines scholarly accounts of the changes to the model.    
2.1 The main characteristics of the Nordic model 
To begin with, the fundament of the Nordic model is argued to be the improvement of 
society’s ability to “master its problems and to enrich and equalize the living conditions of the 
individuals and families” (Erikson in Greve 2007:44). The model has been also outlined by 
mobilization of labor and high degree of women participation in the labor market which has 
influenced the development for a comprehensive latitude of public social policy, a political 
assurance to full employment and reduction of inequalities within various domains (Kautto 
and Kvist 2002:3). As such, the cornerstone characteristics of the model are universalism, 
stateness, and equality.  
The divergent Nordic welfare model characteristics are broadly recognized and are often 
referred to reflect Esping-Andersen's features of social-democratic welfare state regime 
(Kautto and Kvist 2002:3). The author has outlined the fundamental benchmark for the 
distribution of well-being within states, namely their persistent “responsibility for securing 
some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens” (1990:18). The idea is grounded in the 
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concept of social citizenship as a vital pre-requisite for welfare state functioning. The concept 
itself encompasses aspects as social rights (decommodification of one’s position within 
market structure), social stratifications (‘being a citizen’ contends with/substitutes one’s 
belonging within class structure) and the combination of various institutions (the state, market 
and family), as well as their involvement in delivering welfare services (Esping-Andersen 
1990:21). Esping-Andersen distinguishes between three main welfare regimes, namely liberal, 
conservative and social-democratic models of the welfare state. The latter have remained the 
most distinctive among other state clusters acknowledged in the scholar accounts (Kautto and 
Kvist 2002:3). The Scandinavian states’ main characteristics are mirrored in social-
democratic welfare state cluster, namely the high levels of decommodification, low 
stratification (universalism) and stateness. As such, these notions will be in detail explained 
further. 
 
2.1.1 Decommodification 
Decommodification is one of the central notions used to differentiate social rights used in 
each welfare regime. It refers to “a service rendered as a matter of right, and when a person 
can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen 1990:22). 
Esping-Andersen recognizes that each welfare state regime differs in regards to the degree of 
decommodification, which accordingly reliant on how states achieve a particular set of social 
rights dimensions. These dimensions include the accessibility of welfare benefits, income 
replacements and privileges delivered by the state (Esping-Andersen 1990:47; Panitch 
2011:5). The first set is linked to admissibility requirements and boundaries of entitlements: a 
welfare scheme is more likely to attain higher decommodification potential if the benefits 
access is easy. Moreover, the entitlements to an adequate living standards must be assured 
irrespective of “former employment, performance, needs-test, or financial contribution” 
(Panitch 2011:5). The second occurs in case when social insurances considerably plunge 
inferior to average incomes, or when “the standard of living considered adequate and 
acceptable in the society,” which introduces higher work incentives to the receiver of 
assistances (Esping-Andersen 1990:47). As a consequence, there is a growing reliance on the 
market among those people who search for an adequate standard of living.  
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As such, high level of decommodification in Scandinavia is guaranteed through a so-called 
minimum ‘living-wage’ for the unemployed, which can be re-calculated, depending on states’ 
considerations of economy and applications (Socialstyrelsen 2015). In case when the state 
cuts the total that the unemployed are eligible for, then the likeliness of individual’s market 
reliance to keep the same standard of living becomes greater, and the level of 
decommodification decreases (Esping-Andersen 1990:47). Lastly, the third dimension is 
based on the breadth of entitlements. Esping-Andersen claims “advanced capitalist societies 
recognize some form of the social right to protection against the basic social risks: 
unemployment, disability, sickness and old age” (ibid). Moreover, the author introduces an 
advanced case with the notion de facto guaranteed citizens’ wage, where of a social wage 
might be introduced to citizens irrespective of the cause (Panitch 2011:5). 
 
2.1.2 Stratification 
Social stratification within the welfare state refers to the way the pursued system affects 
individual’s status in society. In other words, it is “an active force in ordering social relations” 
and a way to change the dynamics of social inequality (Esping-Andersen 1990:23). As such, 
the author outlines three ideal types of social stratification, followed by principles they 
endorse: hierarchy and status, dualisms and universalism (Esping-Andersen 1990:23; Van 
Kersbergen and Vis 2015:60). The latter is the well-recognized value to characterize social-
democratic welfare states. As Esping-Andersen stated: “it was the social construction of 
solidarity that mattered” and further corresponded to the notion of social-democratic regime 
(1990:65). Therefore, driven by the idea of attaining maximum solidarity between workers, 
universalism requires the reduction of alterations between various groups of workers (ibid). 
 
2.1.3 Stateness 
The Scandinavian model of welfare is grounded on a widespread dominance of the state 
within the welfare provision. Such state prevalence is deeply rooted into social-democratic 
states account and thus exemplifies close and constructive relationship between the state and 
the inhabitants. The consequence of such relationship is not of what Marx defined as state 
distributing “rain and sunshine from above”, but rather that the “20th century state has not 
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been a coercive apparatus of oppression in the hands of the ruling classes” (Alestalo, Hort and 
Kuhnle 2009:1). It has, therefore, advanced into a diplomatic arena for various classes, 
carrying a significant purpose of “agency through which society can be reformed” (Korpi 
1978:48). The stateness also characterizes the less prominent power of family and market, as 
well as the in-between organizations, such as church, common-interest associations and 
others. Nevertheless, it also contains fairly solid essentials of social citizenship and 
reasonably unchanging and incorporated institutions (ibid). The class struggle remained a 
significant component of the Nordic welfare state establishment (ibid). The state is considered 
to be a vital provider of generous public services, employment and a number of tax-based 
cash assistance organizations. Nevertheless, it is important to state that social provisions are 
generally structured at the local level through various municipalities, which network between 
the policy decision makers and the society (ibid).  
It is also important to note that when examining changes within the Nordic welfare model, not 
only similarities, but differences in regards to Scandinavian countries’ labor market 
governance and political compositions must be taken into account (Andersen 2007:14). While 
Denmark is characterized by more liberal labor market with very limited legal protection of 
the worker, other Scandinavian states have a compound interaction between substantial 
statutory minimum parameters and collective arrangements (Dølvik, Andersen and Vartiainen 
2010:4-5). At the same time, the unemployment insurance represents a share of the state 
social security scheme in Norway, while neighboring states remain loyal to their Ghent 
systems with assistances provided by both trade unions funds and the state financial support 
(ibid). As a consequence, union density around 70-80% remains significantly higher in these 
states than in Norway, where it hang about 53% throughout the years (ibid).  
In political terms, Denmark is renowned by weaker positions of Social Democrats and a long-
lasting practice for alternative governments and consistent politics. In contrast, Sweden has 
long been distinguished as a separated outline of class politics and power-relations with a 
dominant Social Democratic party in office during most of the post-war period (ibid). 
Finland, with its comparatively small share of Social Democratic party and strong leftist 
parties, has been subjected to changeable centrist alliances. Lastly, Norwegian Labor Party 
has been a significant actor throughout the post-war period. Nevertheless, the political 
landscape in recent years has pursued the direction similar to Danish, with changes from 
Social Democratic to Centre-Right minority governments and vice versa since the 1970s 
(ibid). 
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Despite all differences across Scandinavian states, there has been a number of anticipated 
outcomes, connected to the concept of the Nordic model. They are the attainment of “low 
income and gender inequality, low poverty rates, and small disparities in living standards” 
(Kautto and Kvist 2002:3). To establish the entire concept of social-democratic or Nordic 
model of welfare, the outcomes mentioned above must work together and strengthen each 
other (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987:69-74). 
 
2.2 Previous research on the changes to the Nordic 
model 
As noted earlier, there is a mounting number of scholar accounts on the welfare state 
development – this study is thus not the first, nor the last to examine the matter. Nevertheless, 
in order to position itself in relation to former studies, this thesis outlines previous research 
and empirical findings on the issue of social insurance retrenchment and welfare state 
development, specifically within the Nordic welfare model. The review is focused on relating 
and opposing the works of prominent authors within the field of welfare state development 
and, thus, does not discourse around each single article or work individually, but rather 
introduces common themes and arguments, as well identifies and evaluates the differences.  
Notably, the period of 1990s is often characterized by a prevalent belief that the direction of 
welfare state development is rather predictable in terms of maintaining the politics of 
expansion. In contrast, the in-depth changes in social policy introduced several possible 
directions for the future of the welfare state development. As such, the ongoing modifications 
in labor market policies have trapped academia in the midst of a systematic reform, where 
policies, insurances and rights transform in accordance to new challenges, actors and 
struggles for power (Andersen 2005:257). 
The research on the linkage between welfare state development and the politics of social 
insurance, specifically unemployment insurance retrenchment, encompasses more than a 
number of articles. Since the very identification of unemployment challenges in Northern 
Europe, a vast majority of scholars turned into addressing possible economic and social 
consequences for the hosting countries and their position within the welfare regime 
classification. Furthermore, many of the findings have made an enormous effect and have 
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contributed to the conduct of further research on the issue of ongoing reduction of 
expenditure. There has been a number of fundamental approaches towards the studies of such 
development, resulting in a critical reconsideration of the mainstream literature on welfare 
state expansion (Anderson 2001:1064). The main attitudes taken towards the issue either state 
that there are no considerable grounds to believe that retrenchment of social insurance has 
qualitative change in the Scandinavian welfare system or that there is a change, provoked by 
various factors, such as institutional or partisan politics.  
In his work “The Scandinavian Welfare State Achievements, Crisis and Prospects” (1995), 
John D. Stephens suggests that reforms undertaken towards social insurance are insignificant, 
whether the amount of unemployment benefits and composition is still more liberal than it 
used to be in 1970s. Nonetheless, the author outlines the importance of a long-term shift. In 
other words, there is a declining number of resources available to preserve the certain level of 
income through nationals’ rights to unemployment insurance. Moreover, there is a growing 
amount of funds invested in solidification of labor activation policies and labor market 
enrollment. Additionally, there has been an upsurge when expanding market ideologies to 
assess the amount of public services. Stephens puts into question whether the Nordic model 
will, in the long run, involuntary alter their welfare agendas to the “lowest common 
denominator” (1995:30). Eventually, it does not represent the case in social-democratic 
welfare states, as they share a high degree of labor efficiency and, thus, can maintain 
worldwide competitiveness. Furthermore, the Nordic model is predominantly unaffected by 
changes encouraged by the international struggle for economic leadership as the export-
oriented development models have been contingent upon above-mentioned competitiveness. 
As a final point, the welfare state has always been characterized by comprehensive political 
patronage in Scandinavia, which allowed it to spread far beyond the social strata. Therefore, 
any short-term reform appears as the one of a limited nature while those insightful deviations 
would entail long-term changes in political coalitions across these states (Stephens 1995:31). 
Furthermore, Andreas Bergh has examined alterations and restructuring within Swedish 
welfare model, also known to fit as a ‘pure’ representative of Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
regimes. When the author analyzes the requirements entailed by Swedish model, he considers 
the model to be arguably dead (Bergh 2010:109). For such purpose, the Swedish pension 
reform in 1990s is taken as an illustration. The presented pension system comprised of two 
virtually autonomous components: a notional defined contribution pay-as-you-go system and 
the defined contribution system (Bergh 2010:116). Contingent on what aspects of the lately 
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introduced pension system to be highlighted, the reform can represent both the rollback of 
Swedish welfare state and the accomplishment of democratic welfare capitalism. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish the appropriate assessment of the reform since one is 
incapable to access the consequences of a counterfactual case where no policy was accepted. 
As such, there should be a degree of awareness when comparing the effects of policy in the 
new system with the estimated outcomes of the former system. Yet, the author confirms that 
regardless of some benefit reductions, Sweden continues to embody a universal welfare state, 
and that such reduction policies can be well defined as “liberalization without welfare state 
retrenchment” (Bergh 2010:109).  
An optimistic forecast was offered by Ferrera and Rhodes (2000). Based on the OECD study 
of 15 cases of fiscal consolidation across 11 countries, the authors contradict that welfare 
states collapse under global and internal forces. Despite being labeled as crisis-affected and 
subjected to the dynamics of retrenchment, welfare states haven’t changed much during past 
years. As such, welfare states are experiencing a so-called route of re-organization and re-
definition but so far “not one of retrenchment along the lines of a neo-liberal pensée unique” 
(Ferrera and Rhodes 2000:442). Therefore, the European welfare states can deal with the most 
serious economic, political and social issues at the same time as combining the fundamental 
values of the European social model. In case the European societies attempt to follow the 
route of plain expenditure, they must not only re-adjust the institutions responsible for welfare 
delivery to the current context, but also upsurge the general adaptability. Such actions will 
ensure improvement of their social and policy learning competencies. Additionally, the 
mentioned countries are presumed to pursuit for new conducts of linking the concept of 
security with flexibility, as well as affordability with solidarity (Ferrera and Rhodes 
2000:442). 
Paul Pierson’s “The New Politics of the Welfare State” (1996) has become a new catalyst for 
the scholarly dispute about the impact of retrenchment politics for the welfare state. In his 
work, the author links the challenges met by traditional governments in Germany and Sweden 
when reducing expenditure on citizen privileges to the decrease of political grounds in welfare 
states. Nevertheless, his attempt did not constitute to the expected results, and, thus, resulted 
in the obvious deficiency of comprehensive retrenchment. As a consequence, Pierson 
developed a theoretical framework, also known as ‘new politics of the welfare state’. The 
theory states that specific institutional structures have a greater capacity to clarify the existing 
paths of new policies (Pierson 1996:152-154). Moreover, the author believes that former 
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approaches towards welfare state expansion, such as socio-economic functionalism and power 
resources theory, are unable to provide feasible justifications for the modern welfare state 
development (1996:147-148).  
The innovative approach of division between old and new politics has become a point of 
departure for many later scholars, indicating Pierson’s work as central to the issue of 
retrenchment. In contrast to Pierson’s assumption, Karen M. Andersen claims that granting 
that economic crisis produced the pressure to reduce expenditure on social insurance, it was 
up to partisan politics to control the expenditures. In her The Politics of Retrenchment in a 
Social Democratic Welfare State (2001), the author claims that the cutback followed only 
when the Social Democratic Party and other sectors of the labor movement reinforced the 
reform. Such outcomes advocate that organized labor has the undeniable political prominence 
in retrenchment politics. Moreover, the dynamics of retrenchment directly “depends on the 
relationship between welfare-state programs and interest group structure” (Andersen 
2001:1088). As soon as the interest group composition reflects principles of solidarity, and 
has centralized, encompassing system of administration, the prior class-based power resource 
framework can offer a more explanatory method than Pierson’s new politics of the welfare 
state (Andersen 2001:1088).  
Herbert Kitschelt offers an outline, suggesting that the politics of party struggle is among a 
number of instruments that impact the retrenchment of social policy (2001:300-302).  By 
using the case studies from Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, and Japan, he demonstrates 
how mechanisms of party rivalry affect the change of social policy. Furthermore, he grounds 
the general assumptions of his claim on other academic judgments around social policy 
retrenchment in the more extensive set of countries. Therefore, his chief statement is to a high 
degree dependent on the idea that leftist parties claim for a larger, more generous state, “even 
though he allows for left parties to pre-empt greater retrenchment by the right”  (Scruggs 
2002:13).  
Some scholars believe that despite the ongoing discussion of “retrenchment” in welfare state 
research, numerous works, in fact, highlight its resilience. Peter Taylor-Gooby (2002) has 
categorized various scholar methods and accounts into three study points, concluding that 
welfare states simply “respond to pressures through adaptation rather than simple 
retrenchment” (2002:601). The examined studies have presented an extensively alike scenario 
of welfare state modification. Firstly, the author concludes that high-spending and generous 
welfare structures will persist and develop. Secondly, the development of welfare states plays 
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a central role in the expenditure increase in two ways – through the political obligations of 
welfare states in general, and, about the individually designed programs. Lastly, only in cases 
where governments did not react to new pressures by cutting back some welfare provisions, 
there have been significant alterations in approach (Taylor-Gooby 2002:601). In practice, the 
negative forecasts on globalization and social change haven’t contributed with much 
evidence. Nevertheless, the fundamental issue for the future of the welfare state development 
is rather the potential duration of resilience. The issue encompasses the careful deliberation of 
the factors that might affect the expansion and development of welfare states. 
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3 Method 
The research interest of this study is to assess empirically how the labor market policies in 
social-democratic welfare state regime have been reformed in the period from 1980 until 
today. As such, this section accounts for the following purposes: 1) describing the method 
framework consisting of the comparative historical analysis, 2) outlining the choice of 
variables used in the study, 3) overviewing the empirical data which lies in the basis of the 
study and 4) explaining the logic behind the case selection. 
 
3.1 The Comparative historical analysis 
The comparative historical analysis is among the oldest research methods, which possesses a 
long-lasting and distinguished history within the social sciences (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 
2003:10). And though one might be lured to outline this method as generally as the practice, 
which incorporates any and all studies with comparison of chronological patterns across 
cases, this thesis will pursue less inclusive characterization due to the relatively narrow scope 
of the study. This study, therefore, utilizes Stefano Bartolini’s definition of comparative 
research combined with Edwin Amenta’s understanding of historical research, and further 
followed by three distinctive features of historical comparative analysis by James Mahoney 
and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. By following this delimitation, the study will be distanced from 
fields, which are often linked to the preference of ‘interpretive’ approaches over causal 
analysis. What is even more significant in decision behind choosing comparative historical 
analysis for directing this study, is the useful consensus in social policy understanding, 
provided by both historical and comparative works (Amenta 2003:121).    
According to Bartolini, the central idea behind comparative research conduct has been 
reflected in recognizing the patterns in social and political matters and establishing theoretical 
and empirically assumptive schemes to explain these patterns (1993:139). As a consequence, 
the comparison of specific political phenomena across at least two or more situational 
  16 
frameworks is required (ibid). To supplement this definition and add up to understanding of 
cross-temporal comparative research, one should take into account what is meant by historical 
research. As such, the practitioner must position the study within the relevant chronological 
frameworks, pursue a sophisticated line to historiography, truly consider the issues of 
“process, timing, and historical trajectories and gain a deep understanding of the cases” 
(Amenta 2003:94). Nevertheless, the concept of comparative historical analysis does not 
merely comprise of combination of the above-mentioned notions; it must be accepted as a 
certain kind of research, preserved as its distinctive scholarly approach (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer 2003:11). 
 Accordingly, it takes account for the further features. Firstly, the method is primarily 
concerned with clarifying and identifying the causal patterns that generate key products of 
interest. The causal arguments play a central role to analysis and, therefore, must be wisely 
selected and tested, not simply led as secondary components of a general narrative (ibid). 
Secondly, the method explicitly examines chronological series and makes solemn 
considerations to the clarifying of specific development over time. To be sure, such 
developments represent temporal processes, and might even overlap with each other, which 
can be crucial when conducting the analysis (ibid). Thirdly, cross-temporal comparative 
research represents a unique field as its investigators are occupied with systematic and in-
detail comparisons of alike and opposing cases. Through retaining a lesser number of cases, 
comparative historical studies can easily balance between theory and empirical evidence in 
many iterations, determine new accounts and improve previously existent theoretical outlooks 
in consideration with comprehensive case evidence (ibid).   
Despite a substantial number of advantages brought by cross-temporal comparative research, 
one must also recognize certain challenges associated with this method. Bartolini emphasizes 
the importance of such recognition in regards to social policy studies over several diverse 
time sequences (1993:147). He then outlines the major issues when conducting comparative 
historical analysis, namely selection of temporal units, developmental generalizations and 
historical multi-collinearity (ibid). The first difficulty refers to periodization, also known as 
the creation of temporal variance of the investigation (ibid). As stated earlier, the paper 
utilizes period between 1980 and 2015. The justification behind such choice represents a 
number of political, economic and policy changes, as well as the discussed transition from 
what was known as Golden Age of welfare state towards the assumed dynamics of 
retrenchment (Stephens 1995:1). There is an existence of factors limiting the investigation 
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within the chosen unit of time, namely some states lack the data for the earliest and recent 
years. Nevertheless, the issue can be addressed with no significant policy changes in those 
states.  
The core of the second problem lies in implying a relationship between two or more variables. 
As such, the cross-time variance significantly deviates from the cross-unit one (Bartolini 
1993:153; Skocpol and Somers 1980:191). It is, therefore, important “to identify the 
‘sequential rules’, which define the probability of transition and change in a given variable 
from one status, value, or phase to another” (Bartolini 1993:153). 
The third problem identified by comparative historical analysis scholars, concerns the 
potential historical multi-colinearity, also referred to as the likelihood of all the series to be 
strongly linked to each other (Bartolini 1993:153; Skocpol and Somers 1980:194-196).  As 
such, an issue remains in unraveling time-based existence and relative prominence (ibid). 
Furthermore, defining whether a change in labor market policies can be plainly reliant on 
partisan politics instead of any other sequential occurrence, taking place at the same time, is 
problematic. Of course, one can address the problem by relying on explanation that “within a 
single unit a general development cannot be adequately explained in causal terms by other 
general developments” (Bartolini 1993:153). However, such clarifications do not eliminate 
the reliability issue. Instead, this thesis focuses on investigation numerous variables in four 
countries over the long-lasting period, divided into subsections of political parties in office. 
Such wide-ranging selection of variables, cases and time units is believed to contribute to the 
increased validity of the study (ibid).   
 
 
 
3.2 Data 
The data used in the study is mostly regained from primary sources, specifically from OECD 
databases, Parliaments and Governments database (ParlGov), various institutional papers and 
peer-reviewed articles, covering the data on the variables and reforms undertaken by 
governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The study also uses Comparative 
Welfare Entitlements Dataset by Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto (2014), which covers information 
data about various institutional features of national social insurance programs.  
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It is important to stress that there are existing limitations, especially while using the chosen 
method of cross-country comparisons. Firstly, the utilized dataset is partial to the 
consideration of a single unemployment benefit practice in all states, while the benefit 
experiences are expected to differ in regards to categories of job-loser (Smith and Zhang 
2008:20).  
Another important aspect, dealt with the majority of quantitative data, is the reliability 
deficiency when it comes to the results (Goldstein 1986:610-614). Nevertheless, since the 
researcher can never be sure whether the presented variables surely depict what they are 
thought to, the operationalization presented in original databases is used.  
 
 
3.3 Variables 
To be consistent with the background and to conduct a comprehensive investigation of how 
the labor market policies have changed in social-democratic welfare cluster, the variables are 
to be classified and clearly operationalized. As such, this study utilizes several variables, each 
indicating the direction of welfare state development, namely the unemployment insurance 
generosity score and the expenditures on employment incentives. The unemployment 
insurance presented in the study refers to the four variables of generosity score on 
unemployment, namely the replacement rates, qualification period, duration and coverage. 
The variables were chosen, following Scruggs (2004) generosity index, a notion similar to 
Esping-Andersen’s decommodification. Public spending on employment incentives refers to 
OECDs operationalization and, thus, includes recruitment incentives, employment 
maintenance incentives, and job rotation and job sharing.  
The investigation of unemployment insurance generosity allows this study to measure the 
change in decommodification level, as the two concepts are similar. According to Scruggs, 
the first motive behind utilizing the concept of ‘generosity’ is to distinguish the results from 
Esping‐Andersen’s widely‐cited measure (2014:5). Furthermore, the used concept more 
correctly defines what is, in fact, being measured in the decommodification index (ibid). As 
such, the study covers changes in four different counterparts of unemployment insurance: the 
replacement rates, qualification period, benefits duration and coverage. In accordance to 
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Pallage, Scruggs, and Zimmermann, unemployment insurance policies consist of numerous 
“different dimensions and thus are extremely difficult to compare through time and space” 
(2008:2). There is, therefore, a need to rely on more specific metrics in comparison studies, 
such as the measurements presented above (ibid). Furthermore, one must keep in mind that 
presented unemployment insurance schemes are only applied as state insurance provisions 
received irrespective of income testing (ibid).  
Moreover, the study aims to assess to what extent the partisan shade of government affected 
the labor market reform activity. In order to do so, the changes to variable means are analyzed 
in accordance to what parties took place in office between 1980s and nowadays. Additionally, 
the study takes a closer look at particular reforms associated with labor market policies. The 
central aim of this investigation is to access whether the decisions on cutbacks or expansion 
were initiated by a specific political party, and what were the motivations behind such 
decisions.    
To begin with, the income replacement rates are calculated for an individual, namely a 
fictional average production worker within industrial sector who is 40 years old, and has been 
previously employed for the 20 years before the eventual redundancy or the assistance period 
(Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto 2014:8). Such operationalization is considered as an adequate 
estimate of the overall situation of a jobless person (Martin 1996:101). Furthermore, the 
replacement rates are subtracted through annualizing the unemployment support for the first 
six-month spell of unemployment (Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto 2014:8).  
Furthermore, qualification period corresponds to the amount of coverage weeks required for 
qualification for the benefits reception (ibid). 
Duration represents the number of assistance weeks exclusive of times of means‐tested 
support (ibid). 
Coverage refers to the percentage of the labor force insured for redundancy threat (ibid). 
Public spending on employment incentives is measured as a % of GDP expenditure on 
recruitment incentives, employment maintenance incentives, job rotation and job sharing 
(OECD 2015). The study uses a common mean, which represents a sum of expenditure on 
each activity. As such, recruitment incentives refer to programs, which deliver financial 
support for a limited period of time, with the purpose to enable the employment of jobless 
people into sectors where most of the labor cost is undertaken by the employer. They 
comprise of payments to persons that are conditional upon the acceptance of a new 
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occupation, specifically to those long-term unemployed (OECD 2014). Employment 
maintenance incentives remain alike but assist the enduring employment, in case of 
restructuring or related (ibid).  
Job rotation stands for the programs endorsing the full replacement of a worker by an 
unemployed person for a fixed timeframe. 
 Lastly, job sharing reveals around arrangements endorsing the partial replacement of an 
employee by a jobless individual (ibid). Such programs enable cross-training possibilities, 
higher incentives and interests both among active labor market participants and people 
seeking for a job. 
All the measures presented in the study are to be calculated as a mean of provision are 
represented in accordance to a specific timeframe, depending on what party was governing 
during the corresponding period. Notably, the study assumes that a party have no influence 
over the social policy unless it is in office for more than a half year. Therefore, the number of 
years is calculated in accordance to the assumption. The operationalization of the variables 
hasn’t been changed from the one offered by used datasets or peer reviewed studies so that the 
issue of reliability deficiency would be minimized. 
3.4 Case selection 
For the purpose of this study, the labor market reforms in Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden seem to be reasonably appropriate candidates for a comparative historical analysis 
method. All countries belong to Esping-Andersen’s social-democratic welfare regime; are 
open economies and have faced likewise economic and labor market constraints in different 
times of selected timeframe in the study.  
At the same time, partisan composition in Nordic states is quite diverse: whereas Sweden has 
a long-lasting tradition of Social Democrats in power, Denmark and Norway have witnessed 
changes from Social Democratic to Centre-Right minority governments and vice versa since 
the 1970s (Dølvik, Andersen and Vartiainen 2010:4-5). 
The reforms in these states are of a great importance due to a number of reasons. Firstly, 
because of their scale and direction: contrary to preceding politics of welfare state expansion, 
many claim that labor market policies have witnessed retrenchment direction and, thus, have 
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brought fundamental change to the whole concept and idea of the Nordic model (Stephens 
1995:30). Secondly, because of the ideological interpretation of the social-democratic parties, 
which though dominating in Scandinavian countries, still call for reform activity. 
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4 Theory 
In order to explain the labor market reform activity in countries belonging to the Nordic 
model, this thesis utilizes several theories and concepts. Each of them also allows for the 
assessment of the role of partisan composition in shaping and reforming the transformations.  
The premises of the first one, namely the notion of path dependency, state that despite the 
reform adaptations pursued by governments of Scandinavian states under welfare state 
pressures, the distinctiveness of the Scandinavian model remains intact and the labor market 
policies have maintained their status quo (Cox 2004:204). In contrast to this account, a 
number of theories identify that there have been changes to labor market policies in virtue of 
Nordic states’ partisan composition. The literature on why and how the politics matter is 
capacious. Yet, the nature of party attachments (partisanship as social identity or rational 
maximization of expected utility) is still largely discussed (Lupu 2013:49). 
The remainder of this section, thus, outlines partisan theories of power resource, ‘new 
politics’ and insider-outsider dilemma to assess the degree to which partisan shade of 
government explains the labor market reform activity. Consequently, hypotheses are 
formulated and put to an empirical test.  
 
4.1 Path dependency 
Among various approaches towards welfare state development, a number of studies have 
commonly claimed that despite ongoing restructuring and new policy directions, the 
modifications made in response to the pressures on welfare state would in fact have been 
made regardless of these pressures. 
The nature of the post-Golden Age welfare regimes is regularly argued to limit the possible 
range of development courses. In accordance to the central premise of path dependency, the 
states might experience even non-incremental changes, but still have little tendency to depart 
from their original paths (Graefe 2004:1). Therefore, the social-democratic welfare regimes 
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will maintain the status quo of their labor market policies regardless of decisions pursued by 
the governments.  
The concept of path dependency has been widely used to describe current transformations of 
welfare regimes and their systems of production, yet there is no single universal definition. 
This thesis will utilize the definition suggested by Margaret Levi, specifically that “path 
dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country (regime) has started 
down a track, the costs of reversal are very high” (1997:28). The track might as well refer to 
the notion of critical junctures, namely the “choice points when a particular option is adopted 
from among two or more” (Mahoney 2001:113). As such, path dependence represents the 
idea that it is problematic for actors to reverse the impacts of choices undertaken in the course 
of critical junctures; thus, they will upsurge the likelihood of countries to follow the 
established path of development (ibid). 
Path dependency is considered to be prevailing within the politics debate, as the political 
arena of action is commonly described by ‘increasing returns’ practices, which at no time 
“increase the cost of changing paths or reversing past decisions” (Graefe 2004:2). Such 
practices consist of a number of requirements. One can identify the collective nature of 
politics among them, as it calls for close cooperation of involved actors in order to withstand 
issues connected to collective actions. Furthermore, the practices include the institutional 
solidity of politics, characterized by variety of compulsory regulations, which constrain and 
shape one’s behavior. Power asymmetries, the struggle of learning in politics, and the 
development of “selective affinities” between policies also contribute to the changing of 
policy, and result in further compensating changes in a sum of linked policies (Pierson 
2000:258-60; Graefe 2004:2; Ebbinghaus and Manow 2001:12). As such, path dependency 
integrates an important share of what is praised by power resources supporters in regards to 
the historical change of welfare states and the consequent regime cluster typology (Pierson 
2001:415). Nevertheless, the explanatory capacity of partisan compositions regarding public 
policy consequences is often imperfect when institutions impacting political actors are not 
considered (Kittel and Obinger 2002:7). Even though institutions are not the primary actors in 
defining public policy, they do outline actor preferences, choices and the modes of the 
interface (ibid). Through outlining the guidelines of the political game, they affect the level of 
political choice freedom. As such, in a nutshell, political actors have limited capacity to 
maneuver in any possible way as previously expected by partisan influence accounts (ibid).  
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Therefore, when applied to the welfare state regimes, the path dependency claims that 
regardless of various changes witnessed throughout time, the distinctness amid clusters is 
assured to remain. Path dependency assumes that challenges, such as economic constraints, 
globalization and demographic pressures do not result in cross-border convergence but, 
highlight the importance of national paths, “as actors process international dynamics in ways 
that correspond to country-specific patterns” (Fetzer 2009:9). The reform discussions across 
the welfare state clusters are there to stay since the congenital institutions influence potential 
policy reactions on the behalf of their control over “administrative capabilities, potential 
reform coalitions, and societal ideologies” (Graefe 2004:2). As such, Huber and Stephens do 
not fully support, but nonetheless lean towards the belief that initial social democratic partisan 
governance combined with centralized and solid business and union association “led to the 
development of social corporatism then locked in later development” (2001:31).  
The main critique of path dependence theory claims that its core theoretical arguments remain 
problematic on the following grounds (Graefe 2004:6-7). Firstly, they have been principally 
neglecting any deliberation on the role of agency, particularly when impacting 
institutionalized paths. The theoretical premises of path dependency are appropriate in 
apprehending “the reality of constraint and inertia, but not very well at anticipating and 
explaining change” (ibid; Crouch 2001:110).  
Secondly, when granting a greater emphasis to the agency concept, one enables examining 
“path shaping strategies within a path-dependent context” (ibid).  In other words, the role of 
social forces is thought to represent an intervention to restructure institutions with the purpose 
of creating new trajectories. In a similar manner, Colin Crouch demands to observe states as 
the holders of a diversified legacy of acting opportunities (2001: 110-112). Such path 
correspondence should thus refer to several possible paths in regards to social acts, rather than 
a constricted, organized trajectory offered by a single actor holding a central power (ibid).  
For the purpose of this thesis, path dependency serves as a framework to explain whether, not 
why, the labor market policies have changed throughout the time. The explanatory capacity 
behind the changes will in traditional manner refer to the agency, with the conventional 
arguments going back to partisan composition and interests of the Scandinavian states.  
 
4.2 Power resource theory 
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From the 1970s and up to the early 1990s the research on welfare state development focused 
specifically on the development of national social policies and the post-war welfare state 
enlargement that reached its peak in the mid-1970s and then started to eventually decline 
(Myles and Quadagno 2001:36). The issue to be explained among scholars was not much of 
why welfare states have developed rather than why they have developed in considerably 
diverse ways. Moreover, it was specifically interesting why the welfare states obtained their 
peak at such remarkably different degrees of expenditures (ibid). The number of studies 
concerned with state expenditures and development soon turned towards the logic of 
industrialism and economic development explanation. Throughout the late 1970s, the group 
of academics attempted to discover a new approach fitting between the formerly prevalent 
understanding of the welfare state as purely functional fundament for capitalist exploitation, 
and the alternate belief that welfare state tracks functionalist reasoning of industrialization 
(Rothstein, Samanni and Teorell 2012:3). It was not until the end of 1970s, when class-
analytical accounts examined other approach, motivated by idea that “politics matters” in 
clarifying the diversity in welfare states development (Myles and Quadagno 2001:36; 
O’Connor and Olsen 1998:6). The notion was later transformed in what is now known as 
power resource theory, profoundly rooted in a theory of distribution within capitalist 
democracies.  
A theoretical product of evolutionary Marxist adherents, the power resource framework has 
been long focused on the scenarios for social democracy across the European continent, 
predominantly in Sweden. Originally the concept was introduced by Walter Korpi, who 
specified the prior accounts of Lenski (1966) and Hewitt (1977). The accounts included that 
egalitarian polities deliver the possibility for majorities to withstand the ‘few’; and that only 
the lower classes practice their votes to elect clearly “class-based parties to represent their 
interests will democracy result in more equality” (Myles and Quadagno 2002:37). The power 
resource framework has shortly after developed into a central paradigm in the field, 
establishing the standard assumptions against which other theories would be confirmed or 
falsified (Orloff 1993:306).  
Walter Korpi defines power resources as “the attributes (capacities or means) of actors 
(individuals or collectivities) which enable them to reward or punish other actors” (1985:33). 
The author considers that one must access and examine the distributive developments in 
capitalist democracies in order to revise the development of welfare states. As such, he states 
that in the case when labor and capital remain utmost directly opposed in the capitalist, “labor 
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is strictly accorded a subordinate role” (1985:37). The reason behind such statements is an 
apparent assumption that in capitalist democracies, employers enjoy more power resources 
than the workers, and such uneven dispersal of power resources is institutionalized (ibid). As 
a consequence, two classes end up with receiving different gains from the state institutions’ 
management; thus, generating a conflict of class interests (ibid).  
Furthermore, Korpi claims that such ‘subordination’ of the working class can change 
throughout time and might vary across countries, due to the level of an employee 
organization. The given level refers to the exercise of collective action through unions and 
political parties; thus, the difference in state operating can significantly vary “as a reflection 
of the distribution of power resources in these societies” (ibid). In cases where the workers are 
better organized and have a considerable share of power over the government, one can track a 
minor change in the control of power resources between the prominent classes (Korpi 
1980:309). Therefore, the working class owns a superior position and is equipped with the 
greater capacity to act. As a consequence, power resource theorists predict that workers will 
attempt to affect government’s policy-making decisions and push for more generous and 
distributive policies to be implemented.  
In contrast, the industrial arena will try to confront such policies, and thus the struggle 
between the classes in inevitable (ibid). Accordingly, states, characterized by highly 
mobilized working classes and lasting social democratic control in the government, have less 
income disparity, greater redistributive outcomes and a smaller amount of poverty than other 
countries (ibid). In the case where states’ common laborers are not as mobilized and are 
omitted from the administration, the industrial conflict will persist amongst various classes. 
As a result, such states lean towards having a higher level of earnings inequality, a larger 
share of poverty and government resources with minor redistributive purpose (ibid). 
Power resource theory has delivered significant explanations of size deviation, features, and 
consequences of the welfare state. The framework emphasizes that power resources in 
capitalist democracies are tightly connected to their class structure. Moreover, the power of 
working class is accomplished through interests of labor unions or left political parties, and, 
thus, results in creating equal and democratic distributional effects (Korpi 1980:298). The 
social policies carried out as the state intervention into the distributive process are commonly 
established through administrative sections and agencies. Such interventions are significant in 
terms of income change to power buying as they enter in different stages of transfer programs 
and are related to both economic and monetary policies (Korpi 1980:301). Thereby, social 
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policies might be divided into two models, namely marginal and institutional types. The 
former is aimed at targeted population groups, “separating the poor and minorities from the 
better-off majority of the population” (Korpi 1980:305). The latter enters the distributive 
process in relatively early terms and is oriented to generous, non-excluding protection, as well 
as the increase in labor-market participation and decrease unemployment. The countries 
belonging to the social-democratic welfare regime tend to pursuit the institutional model of 
social policy, as the result of the strong worker class mobilization and the share of social 
democratic parties in power. 
Furthermore, Korpi claims that the major themes behind the power resource approach focus 
on the distributive conflicts, which mirror the basic splits in employment associations and 
labor markets (2006:168). Such splits have a tendency to cause interactions between class, 
life-course risks, and resources. For that reason, the classifications with greater life-course 
hazards are more likely to partake lower individual funds to manage the risks, which in a 
long-run fosters a perspective for the class-based collective action. The political parties 
grounded in socioeconomic groups are reasonably underprivileged in relation to their 
economic means and, thus, depend on the labor force. They are, therefore, projected to be 
protagonists towards the welfare state expansion and policies meant to transform conditions 
and consequences associated with market distributive practices (ibid). Furthermore, the power 
resources approach results in defining welfare states as policies influencing outcomes of and 
requisites for distributive courses in the sphere of markets, which aim to reduce inequality and 
poverty (Korpi and Palme 2003:428) 
Furthermore, it is also important to note that one of the principal researchers within the power 
resource approach, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, perceives universal welfare states not as a pure 
political objective of social democracy, but as a significant tool within partisan politics 
(1985:8-9). The collective welfare programs correspondingly establish an essential 
administrative device for social democratic parties and thus largely contribute to outlining the 
road to power (ibid). As such, the expansion of universal welfare state in Nordic countries is 
believed to be an outcome of careful social democratic approach, which encompasses the 
elimination of market from the social policy domain and benefits the state grounded on 
collectivism and interaction between various social layers (Klitgaard 2007:173). The 
universal welfare policies join numerous citizens under the theme of welfare recipients and 
consequently equip a great share of the voters with incentives to upkeep the welfare state. 
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Such policies substitute a party-political connection between Social Democrats and the 
electorate, resulting in generating a vital tool in activating the political support (ibid). 
 
4.3 The ‘new politics’ of welfare and Nixon-goes-to-
China 
 
As claimed by Theodore Lowi, “new policies determine new politics” (1972:299). Such 
formulation serves as one of the fundamental premises of the ‘new politics’ of welfare 
framework, a notion developed by Paul Pierson in order to distinguish the popular politics of 
welfare state expansion and the unpopular politics of welfare state retrenchment (Ross 
2000:155). While the expansion policies enjoy a vast share of support and acceptance among 
actors, the inventiveness of expenditure reduction tends to provoke public resistance. 
Therefore, the retrenchment process is often a politically complex process, dependent on the 
activating capability of interest groups and policy supporters, shaped by prior policies. In fact, 
Pierson does not deny changes provoked by partisan composition, but he concludes that the 
partisan center of gravity has a minor impact on welfare state retrenchment (Scruggs and 
Allan 2002:10). The role played by previous policies appears to be prior to what partisan 
politics, social movements, and labor unions can influence. Therefore, they represent the 
central variable in illuminating the institutional struggle of welfare states to change (Pierson 
1996:153; Andersen 2001:1064).  
The notion widely refers to the idea of blame avoidance amid political parties, where the new 
politics accounts outline several elements to assist leaders in responsibility distribution in 
regards to conflictual and often unwanted policies of welfare distribution (ibid). As such, the 
new politics approach argues that the post-war period, characterized by welfare state 
expansion is not simply the ideological struggle between political parties, but a reasonably 
straightforward rivalry amid office-bearers to deliver widely popular reforms to the electorate 
(Korpi and Palme 2003:430). At the same time, the retrenchment period allows political 
leaders to mobilize undesirable prejudice at the time they try to withdraw entrenched social 
rights from their voters (ibid). 
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Comparative welfare state literature has so far dedicated much less attention to the reasons 
behind welfare state policies execution, rather than the difficulties associated with 
undertaking the policies (Klitgaard 2007:174). The causes that open the way for reform 
existence are expected to be a foundation in accordance to which the analysis is executed; the 
causes are rarely researched empirically. Such occurrence also takes place within the ‘new 
politics’ approach when applied to current welfare state research. In this manner, the issue of 
what the driving forces behind office-bearers decision to carry out a reform are, is vastly 
neglected, and, thus, largely depends on the assumption that reforms mirror the economic 
challenges (ibid). The same issue applies for the ‘new politics’ accounts, where there is a 
“certain prominence of the relationship between welfare state reforms and social democratic 
parties” (Kitschelt 2001:275; Green-Pedersen 2002:274-275). In this context, the central 
arguments of ‘new politics’ theoretical framework about policy as the tactics of blame 
avoidance, is summarized into a single statement. The statement, accordingly, outlines an 
amazing reform capacity of social democratic governments to use a ‘Nixon-goes-to-China’ in 
order to escape the blame for service retrenchment (Klitgaard 2007:174; Ross 2000:162-165).  
The capacity itself applies to the situation in 1972, when an anticommunist Republican 
president of United States Richard Nixon could “reconcile with Chinese communists without 
raising suspicions of selling out American interests” (Klitgaard 2007:174). As such, political 
frontrunners who are thought to be bordering on the edge of politically delicate matter are 
more likely to be constrained; and the capability for leadership is uppermost where a feared 
path of action was considered as improbable (ibid). When applying such reasoning to the 
social policy domain, one should expect that the social democratic governments participate in 
unpopular retrenchment reforms since they receive greater trustworthiness in defending the 
system among the voters than right-wing oriented reformers (ibid). By this premise, 
widespread market-oriented policies in the welfare state might mirror the presence of social 
democratic parties in office. Nevertheless, the strategy does not offer any rational response to 
why the social democratic administrations participate in restructuring the welfare state and 
initially follow the market-oriented values.  
Accordingly, ‘the new politics’ thesis rests upon three central grounds. Firstly, the cutback 
initiatives represent unpopular in regards to both general public and specific interest groups. 
Secondly, any policies have the impact on politics direction and, therefore, must be addressed 
by political frontrunners in a way to develop innovative and creative strategies to avoid 
blame. Thirdly, each policy is path dependent, which means that the prevailing welfare 
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agendas determine options for blame avoidance and retrenchment (Ross 2000:156). There is, 
however, an important omission that the theoretical framework is often criticized for. In spite 
of the widespread consideration of policy structures, institutions, and interests, the new 
politics has limited deliberation around partisan politics. The theory holds quite implicit 
assumptions, supposing that within the so-called ‘old politics’, left parties aim to expand the 
welfare state regardless of external challenges, whereas the main purpose of the right-wing 
parties is to downsize the welfare state (ibid). 
There are some issues concerned with the ‘new politics’ framework. The first one concerns 
parties’ motivations and incentives behind pursuing the unpopular policies of retrenchment. 
As such, both left- and right-wing parties around the world have established an outline that 
contains both expenditure reductions and reorganization (Ross 2000:159). In order to adopt 
the notion of unchanging partisan impacts throughout governing context, one must regard 
parties as purely utility maximizing units, profoundly indifferent to the changes within their 
prevailing environment and with ideological stands shifting with regards to the interests. 
Notably, the preferences, morals, and institutional composition deviate from country to 
country, but there is a growing trend of left-wing and center parties to turn towards market-
oriented policy solutions, partly because of the external challenges faced by the welfare state 
(ibid). And while it becomes more common for the left-wing parties to shift to the right when 
in office, some of the left and center administrations have considerably changed to the right 
within the rhetoric, reforms, and control. Workfare and shift towards lesser dependency on the 
state provision have become the common themes on for a number of leftist matters, which 
puts a new challenge for the ‘new politics’ of welfare (ibid). The role of parties must be 
reshaped with consideration of first choices, values, and principles, which are certainly 
important.  
Yet, the latter does not arrange for the distinct incentive for action. A partial explanation for 
left-wing parties’ shift towards right lies in the trustworthiness gap pursuing leftist parties 
since the 1970s, characterized by generous social policies, relatively high taxes and 
expenditures (ibid). As a consequence, the growing necessity for parties to attract employers 
and market-dependent actors forced a number of Social Democrats rightwards while the right-
wing parties sought to diminish any charges for the retrenchment of social insurance. Indeed, 
in line for risking the unfavorable election outcomes and the deficiency of voter support for 
essential cutbacks in public provisions, the policy freedom of the right has been significantly 
reduced (ibid).  
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4.4 Insider-outsider politics 
According to Herbert Kitschelt, uncovering strategies of social democratic parties involves a 
“bridge across the familiar divide between students of comparative political economy and 
parties and elections” (1999: 318). Noteworthy, parties in this sense represent a concept, 
combining both the premises of the power resource theory and the ‘new politics’ of welfare. 
They are the set of politicians, committed to ideological beliefs but oriented on satisfying 
historically meaningful groups of the electorate to win the election (Garrett and Lange 
1991:543). 
David Rueda has contributed to a better understanding of partisanship role in establishing 
market policies through differentiating between insider and outsider preferences (2006). As 
such, the framework refers to the interest rivalry between those workers whose positions are 
secured by labor revenue costs (insiders) and those who do not enjoy such protection 
(outsiders). The insiders possess greater influence than the outsiders as they have market 
power: they can partake in income negotiations, take industrial action and use many other 
ways to demonstrate their power (Sigeman 1999:265). As a consequence, insiders try to 
uphold their employment positions through firmer work protection regulation while the 
outsiders care about unemployment and the ways to grant their belonging to the insiders’ 
niche. As such, the latter favor active labor market policies (ALMP), specifically the greater 
expenditure on employment incentives. Such deviation in preferences serves as the major 
explanation for parties’ strategic behavior. According to Rueda, “social democratic parties 
have strong incentives to consider insiders as their core constituency” since the latter are 
connected to greater work protection regulation instead of labor market policies (2007: 2). 
The insider-outsider theory tends to define labor market partakers as particularly rational 
actors. Assuming such rational behavior, the insiders are anticipated to emphasise their own 
workforce engagement and to request income increases, which are beyond the interests of 
outsiders, thus preserving somewhat higher unemployment rates (Lindbeck and Snower 
2001:172). Nevertheless, Rueda also considers the changing nature of insiders’ first choices, 
which sequentially affects the approach undertaken by social democratic governments (ibid). 
Such changing preferences usually occur when insiders come to be more like outsiders, 
namely under the conditions of high levels of unemployment vulnerability and low degree of 
corporatism (ibid). For the reason of blame avoidance and manipulating payoffs, political 
parties seek to increase their electorate through appealing to the largest group, gaining from 
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the introduced reforms (Vis 2013:13).  Such policies aim to decrease the degree of blame, and 
by this means upsurge reform’s success through handling the prevalence of gains and losses 
among individuals impacted by the reform (ibid). Nonetheless, manipulating payoffs do not 
come easy, mainly because of the difficulty in determining which group represents the best 
choice (from a vote-seeking perspective) “to let bear the burden of retrenchment” (ibid). 
There has also been a discourse around this insider–outsider conflict often faced by the 
Centre-left parties (specifically the Social Democrats) (2013:2). In the case when these parties 
give emphasis to insiders’ preferences, outsiders tend to either vote for other political parties 
or simply refrain from voting and vice versa (ibid).  
Accordingly, this conventional framework takes a shift from traditional theories of partisan 
politics, while it still assumes political parties to have “a core constituency whose support is 
needed to win elections” (Rueda 2006:389). Since the 1980s (1970s in Denmark), 
Scandinavian states faced severe economic constraints, followed by higher levels of 
unemployment and the eventual emergence of ‘outsiderness’. While the degree to which 
insiders are safeguarded from redundancy, provide grounds to oppose greater employment 
incentives, their interests considerably contrast to those of outsiders. The possible advantages 
of such labor market policies for insiders are minor while the actual costs (taxes and low-
wage competition) are great (ibid). Nevertheless, influences that increase insiders’ 
vulnerability to unemployment, such as the increase in unemployment rates, determine 
groups’ support for outsiders’ preferences, as well as parties’ strategies towards labor market 
reform activity. Unlike other employment-related policies, stimulating employment incentives 
are intended to crop secure engagement in the workforce for those who are jobless, which turn 
outsiders into unmistakable beneficiaries. The insider-outsider dilemma, thus, clarifies 
changes within labor policies, as the reaction of both social democratic and right-wing parties 
to pressures from the outside to the welfare state, and, more fundamentally, the prerequisite to 
maintain it with purpose of achieving voters’ support (Volckmar and Wiborg 2014:119). 
Consequently, parties are thought to pursue the logic of vote-seeking behavior and apply to 
the greater electorate, which, in this case, would be those affected by growing unemployment, 
namely outsiders and those insiders, vulnerable to unemployment. In case they do so, the 
expenditures on employment incentives should grow.  
 
4.5 Hypotheses formulation 
  33 
Taken into account the preceding literature and empirical findings on the issue, this study 
turns to the assessment of several research hypotheses to address how the countries within the 
social-democratic regime could have reformed their labor market policies and the role played 
by partisan politics in such reform activity. The formulations are the following: 
H1: The nature of social-democratic welfare state regime is path dependent, which means that 
labor market reforms have not undergone any systematic changes throughout the past 35 
years, or that there have been only small-scale changes. Hence, the concept of retrenchment 
does not seem to be an adequate and applicable notion to the unchanging dynamics of labor 
market policies. 
The hypothesis does not seem to be easily supported in the light of the previous results on the 
changes to the Nordic model. Yet, the discordance in scholar accounts on the matter serves as 
an additional motivation to verify whether path dependency assumptions hold true or not. 
H2: In accordance to power resource theory, the labor market policies are modified in regards 
to partisan composition in each state. States characterized by strong leftist parties and high 
union density will pursue more generous/less retrenching policies.  
As such, states where social democratic parties have strong governing positions and high 
unionization rates, might be limited in the expansion of welfare services due to the ‘era of 
austerity’ concerns, but will tend to have lower degrees of cost-cutting than those where 
actors demonstrating “narrow interests have strong incentives to engage in rent-seeking 
behavior” (Anderson 2001:1072). In addition, based on unemployment insurance provision 
and employment incentives expenditure, the Scandinavian countries might have different 
levels of benefits provision due to the different composition of the parties in power. 
H3: The ‘new politics’ framework assumes that the retrenchment of unemployment benefits 
policies are easier pursued by social democratic governments as they possess the capacity to 
exploit a ‘Nixon-goes-to-China’ strategy to avoid the blame for retrenchment. 
Therefore, the changes in labor market policies represent nothing less than the politics of 
retrenchment, opposite to what Nordic states experienced in Golden Age of expansion. The 
parties do not act on the behalf of their ideological beliefs, but rather pursue their interests to 
remain in power under the economic challenges throughout avoiding the blame for reduction 
of expenditure in social provision. 
H4: Lastly, the insider-outsider framework suggests that in their search for power, both social 
democratic governments and their opponents act on the behalf of vote-seeking perspective 
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and, therefore, use various strategies of either benefit retrenchment or expansion to appeal to 
preferred electorate. In the case when the work protection is insignificant, the social 
democratic governments are not as exposed to insiders’ burden and thus tend to follow 
policies to support outsider. Consequently, social democratic governments will spend more on 
employment incentives and liberalizing the labor market. 
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5 Analysis 
This section summarizes the output obtained after collecting and calculating the data on labor 
market policies in Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway between 1980s and 2015. In order 
to measure the dynamics and the direction of welfare state development within each country 
belonging to the social-democratic welfare state regime, and the impact of partisan 
composition on such dynamics, it is important to determine how the unemployment insurance 
provision and employment incentives expenditure have transformed throughout time, space 
and political context. As noted earlier in the Method section, all the measures presented in the 
study are calculated as a mean of provision throughout the period a certain party was in 
office. As such, they represent a common result.  After the adjustment of data, the calculation 
of six different variables across Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway in the period of 
1981-2015 remain. Table 1 presents variable means, followed by a summary of extracted 
results and reflections.  
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Table 1. Policy change by Government 
 
 
Source: Parliaments and governments database, OECD, Scruggs (2014) 
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Notes: ** Prior to Paavo Lipponen, Anneli Jääntteenmäki had been in office between 17 April 
2003 and 24 June 2003. Due to the brief time in office and the fact that she was followed by 
the same party representative, the study doesn’t include her in the database. 
*** Kiviniemi was later followed by representatives of the Conservative party in office, but 
due to the lack of data, she will remain the last examined case in Finland. 
 
As seen from the Table 1, all countries belonging to social-democratic welfare state regime 
experience the change towards lowering the so-called benefit provision, whereas replacement 
rates dropped significantly in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, they remain somewhat at the 
same level in Norway. Qualification period remains the same in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden, while it started growing under the Social Democratic party in office in Finland. In 
regards to the benefit duration period, it persisted to be unchangeable in Sweden while faced 
significant cutback in Denmark, which, nevertheless, upholds to be have the most extensive 
duration period among social-democratic welfare states. Furthermore, it grew in Finland 
under the Social Democrats and has stayed relatively high afterwards. In Norway, the number 
of benefits weeks grew under Christian Democrats, but then dropped closer to the former 
level under the Conservatives and the Social Democrats.  The percentage of insured labor 
force in Sweden started growing under Bildt government and maintained high under the 
Social Democrats, but then dropped significantly under Reinfield, which might also be the 
consequence of 2008 economic crisis. In Denmark, Norway and Finland the coverage 
remained higher under the Social Democrats. Public spending on employment incentives 
tends to grow in Sweden under the Conservatives, in Denmark under the Social Democrats, 
and stays at the similar level in Finland and Norway.  
 
5.1 Labor market reforms 
The four states investigated in this thesis undeniably vary from each other when it comes to 
unemployment insurance provision and employment incentives expenditures even though 
they all represent the theoretical belonging to the same welfare state regime. Their welfare 
state, political and economic development, unemployment insurance schemes and attitudes 
towards labor market participation share different historical backgrounds, which makes it 
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crucial to analyze each country separately before trying to simply group all the results under 
the same theme. As seen from Table 1, labor market policies have transformed throughout 35 
years. Uncovering the process of labor market policies reforming in regards to partisan 
politics, also includes a closer look at pursued policies rather than simple tracing of provision 
under the definite timeframes. For this reason, the study analyzes each state in terms of its 
political composition and the impact it has on changing nature of unemployment insurance 
provision and the dynamics employment incentives spending. The section will accordingly 
evaluate how each state developed and what could be the political (and even economic) 
factors, impacting the welfare state development in these countries from 1980s.   
 
5.1.1 Denmark 
In contrast to other countries belonging to the social-democratic welfare cluster, Denmark 
was at the outset to face the severe increase of unemployment, stimulated by the 1970s oil 
crisis. The precedent policies of generous unemployment benefits and substantial social 
security provisions appeared to intensify the issue of redundancy even more. As such, the 
unemployment and inflation amounts rose as high as 10% while the state deficits had 
extended to the same degree, and foreign debts stored promptly by 1982 (Andersen 2008:34). 
Consequently, this affected in Conservative-Liberal government to take power between 1982 
and 1993; it directly loosened the capital markets and moved towards strict expenditure 
restraint policies within the public segment. In conjunction with introduced actions aimed at 
reducing sequestered consumption, the reforms assisted in preserving structural inequities in 
Danish budget. Nevertheless, the cost of the reforms reflected in the degree of unemployment 
mounting up to 12.4% in 1993 (ibid). There was an apparent need for further reforms, which 
was satisfied straight after the Social Democratic-Radical Liberal governments came to office 
in 1992. As well as their predecessors, the party highlighted the importance of economic 
responsibility, but discarded the temporary reduction of expenditure and consigned the 
primacy to employment stimulation (Huo 2009:202). Indeed, before the Social Democrats 
took place in the office, the unemployment insurance system in Denmark remained 
submissive rather than active. It has correspondingly endured the superior liberality towards 
welfare provision, standing for the indisputable peak of the social rights of citizenship 
(Marshall 1950:47). One must also understand that the main difference between the Social 
Democratic coalition administration in 1993 and the forerunning Conservative-Liberal 
  39 
government was the political capacity of the former mentioned to perform in accordance with 
the new model.  The model was intended to function on the instruments of alternative policy 
solutions, supported by Keynesian demand-activating reforms (Andersen and Pedersen 
2007:6). As such, the Social Democratic party presented a labor market reform in 1994, 
which indicated the initial challenge to transform the central purposes of social insurance in 
Denmark. The undertaken reform was scheduled to be implemented throughout three stages, 
namely in 1994, 1996, 1999.  It has required the emergent accent on the duty to accept job 
proposals as a measure to receive the maintenance of unemployment assistance. 
Simultaneously, the launched policies were intended to advance occupation abilities required 
among the unemployed. In addition, the rough guide to new individual action plans, 
recruitment incentives, job sharing and rotation programs were among the means aimed at the 
achievement of the policy goals. Another vital component of the undertaken reform 
represented an extensive economic strategy to push for “private consumption and the demand 
for labor” (ibid). As a final point, there were also foundations connected to the policies that 
assisted in labor supply decrease. Accordingly, individuals who took part in the labor market 
programs mentioned above, ceased to remain listed as jobless.  
The 1994 labor market reform wasn’t the only modification undertaken by Danish Social 
Democrats. As can be noticed in Figure 1, it was the initial length of redundancy benefits at 
the outset of drawback: to seven years in 1995, five years in 1996 and four years in 1999. 
These alterations appeared to be groundbreaking within the Danish case framework, as the 
duration of unemployment benefits was practically unlimited to aforementioned labor market 
changes (Huo 2009:203). 
Figure 1. Unemployment Benefits Replacement Rate and Duration in Denmark 1980-
2002 
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Source: Scruggs 2004 in Huo (2009) 
Notes: Benefits duration in 1980 (442 weeks) is re-coded as 1. 
 
The choice of limiting the determined period of redundancy benefits in 1994 represented a 
unique and initial case in history where an actual limit was practiced. Besides the reduction of 
the benefit duration, the Social Democratic party has too enforced the idea of working 
conditions based on appropriateness for redundancy assistances: 6 months of non-supported 
employment in 1995 and extended to 12 months in 1996 (ibid). 
Whereas the unemployment compensation scheme in Denmark had formerly been associated 
with more liberal approach towards replacement rates and tremendously long period of 
benefits, the reforms launched by the Social Democratic party took the country closer to 
European average (ibid). The reforms do not mean, however, that the dynamics of 
retrenchment substituted the general development of the welfare state. In accordance to Korpi, 
the social policies implemented as the state involvement appear to be important in regards to 
income change and power buying ratio (1980:301). They are similarly connected to both 
economic and monetary policies; thus, in social-democratic welfare states they are aimed at 
generous, non-excluding protection, as well as the increase in labor-market participation and 
decrease unemployment (ibid). The reforms made by Social Democrats didn’t affect the 
generosity level that much (the duration period and the replacement rates for lowest income 
groups remain extremely high in comparison to other OECD countries), but did contribute to 
fostering growth of employment rates. Moreover, the undertaken direction towards 
employment stimulation prioritization over the generous replacement rates resulted in 
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increased expenditure on employment services. As such, Figure 2 also represents the risen 
levels of expenditure on employment services (including the employment incentives) at the 
time of Social Democrats incumbency. 
Figure 2. Employment Service Expenditure as Percentage of GDP in Denmark 1983-
2003  
 
Source: OECD 2006 in Huo (2009) 
At the same time, Denmark, together with Finland and Sweden, are representatives of a Ghent 
system, in which the redundancy funds are connected to labor unions. The latter hold a 
substantial share of administration over how the funds are to be used. Nevertheless, the pre-
reform organization in Denmark decreased the prospects for unions to make capital 
entitlements on the social security system as it was already close to being purely tax-financed 
(Huo 2009:202; Andersen 2008:40). In response to the faced challenges, labor unions in 
Denmark pursued an unusually dissimilar strategy as the one accepted by labor unions in 
other states. Through choosing to avoid industry or government clash about labor market 
challenges created by external pressures, they incorporated the concept of flexicurity and new 
jobs creation as a central approach towards employment protection in the state (ibid). 
As a response to unions and government actions, Danish population didn’t feel confounded 
about the retrenchment of unemployment benefits, but rather enjoyed the feeling of safety: in 
case people lost work, they could find new employment in relatively short terms. The studies 
represented by Auer suggest that even with the lower degree of official employment 
protection, all categories of workers in Denmark enjoyed the higher belief in securing their 
future workplace (2007:16-17). 
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The 1994 changes were essentially continued by the following Liberal-Conservative 
government under Anders Fogh Rasmussen, which took over the office in 2001. Already in 
2002 the new administration (in agreement with country’s Social Democratic party) accepted 
the so-called fourth stage of former ALMP, followed by More people to work and an 
integration package A new chance for all in 2005 (Anderson 2008:38). The political 
discussion over the latter package initially included the Social Democrats participation and 
contribution, but the party has drawn back its approval before the very implementation of the 
policy. The reason behind such decision, given by the Social Democrats is the greater accent 
on encouragements rather than on the concept of social citizenship from the bourgeois 
alliance (Andersen 2002:160; Madsen 2003: 105).  
The 2002 reform sustained a consolidation of conditionality notion: obtaining an applicable 
occupation from the beginning of redundancy period, individual contact arrangements with 
“conversations every 3 months and CV talks after 4 weeks at the latest are introduced with the 
reform” (Anderson 2008:39; The Danish Government 2011:15). Moreover, its central aims 
represented the overall solidification of the economic encouragements to attract more people 
into the labor market. The means for successful implementation included both the 
benefit/allowances schemes and the tax system reconsideration. As such, the directive to the 
degree of social support was reduced, and the ceiling for the total of the support has been 
presented (ibid). Furthermore, the integration agreement “A new chance for everyone” 
suggested an upgrading of work encouragements relative to acceptance of social coverage. 
The new Social Democratic government that entered office in 2009 has faced a number of 
serious issues linked to 2008 economic crisis, which has impacted on an intense growth of 
unemployment rates. Inspired by the successful achievements of their forerunners, the 
government intended to implement a reform of the unemployment benefits system. The main 
goal of the reform was the intensification labor supply through encouraging the jobless to 
seek for a job more keenly (Madsen 2013:12). The means of motivation represented a shorter 
duration of unemployment and fear of exhausting the assistances. Nevertheless, opposed by 
labor unions and decline in insured employees, the administration didn’t pursue the further 
conditionality approaches, but rather restructured the activation policy in the way that could 
be more contributive for the labor market demands. The government introduced several 
policies intended to upgrade the skills of individuals without a job, namely the broader 
admission to tutoring for unemployed and the reinforced efforts to decrease the drop-out rate 
from job-related training system (ibid). 
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5.1.2 Sweden 
Until the beginning of 1990s Swedish unemployment insurance did not experience any major 
changes linked with the cutback of provision or benefits. Like many others, the Swedish 
system of unemployment assistance carries the features of the progressive compensation 
scheme, with higher replacement rates for low-income employees and vice versa.  The 
scheme functions on the behalf of a ceiling for the benefits amount. It wasn’t until 1993 when 
the liberal-conservative government decreased the so-called benefits ceiling; and, further, cut 
the replacement rates from 90 to 80% in response to the severe economic and fiscal crisis 
(Huo 2009:207). The key approach of the administration in combating the growing 
unemployment rates represented the decline of benefit total and narrowed the admissibility 
criteria (ibid). 
It was rather a short period in 1996 when the social democratic government continued the line 
of preceding bourgeois administration and cut the replacement rates by 5%. Under the 
growing opposition of labor unions, they returned the replacement rates back to the 80% level 
in 1997; and further increased benefit generosity for the first 100 days of redundancy 
(Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu 2001:767; Huo 2009:2007-209). It is important to state the 
significance of unions’ role in the case of Swedish unemployment insurance evolution. 
Besides the amount and duration of assistances, unions have a stable share of power when 
managing the distribution of assistances. Not only have the Social Democrats reversed the 
reduction of replacement rates, but have they also upturned the intentions of predecessor 
bourgeois government to replace unions from unemployment insurance management (Huo 
2009:209). In other words, the Social Democratic party have pursued the stimulation of union 
strength significance, and the organized workforce has remained with its corporatist 
domination.  
Indeed, right after the unemployment rates started to decline, the Swedish Democratic Party 
turned to the reverse strategy and aimed at restructuring rather than retrenching the 
unemployment insurance. In conjunction with high replacement rates, they launched a 
narrowed eligibility criteria for benefits collection (ibid). This strategy echoed the approach of 
Danish Social Democrats, whose relatively generous assistances are combined with a tough 
work-conditionality would result in a solution to emerged issue of unemployment. The 
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cutback in replacement rates and higher demands for admission criteria in services and 
benefits as sick pay, work injury, and unemployment insurance schemes were complemented 
by the enlarged expenditure on employment incentives (Huber and Stephens 2001:253; 
Iversen 1998:72). By the power resource theory, such marked-oriented measures should be 
rather understood as the connection to welfare support. As such, to operate in terms of power 
resource capacity, the welfare state appears to be subjected to popular trust and democratic 
electorate. Such subjection allows the state to identify welfare institutions as an appropriate 
foundation for collective action (Klitgaard 2007:173). As well as in Denmark, the Swedish 
Social Democrats tried to appeal to the low-income interest group, where the provision of 
unemployment services didn’t change a lot. Instead, the cutbacks in unemployment insurance 
provision were targeting the long-term unemployed, who would potentially represent a free-
rider problem. Through such means, the government aimed at receiving more support from 
those trying to secure the place in work through various activation and education programs. 
For this reason, in case when Social Democrats believe that certain policy problems pose a 
risk to welfare state legitimacy, they tend to apply market-oriented modifications to avoid the 
loss of legitimacy and letdown in electorate support (ibid).  
The new social democratic government under Persson has moderately upturned the course of 
gradual growth in benefits system progressivity. Instead, it introduced some reforms that 
included upsurges in benefits ceilings and the introduction of a two-tiered benefits structure. 
As such, the 2001 reform has also brought changes on the topic of search and admission 
requirements and assistance approvals (Bennmarker, Carling and Holmlund 2005:90-92; 
Forslund and Krueger 2010:172). The mentioned changes came into effect as soon as on 5th of 
February, 2001. Also, the launched policy resulted in job search constraint within one’s 
occupation and the limited labor market in the first 20 weeks of redundancy. After this period 
has been exhausted, the search scope must be extended (ibid). In this context, the introduced 
reform provided an access towards improved generosity as the prior government didn’t 
contain entitlements to limit the search. Nevertheless, it could have also represented the case 
that guidelines, tolerating constrained search, existed correspondingly before 2001, as a 
minimum during the initial weeks of redundancy (ibid). The 2001 reform established the 
determined duration of unemployment insurance at 60 weeks for all entitled job seekers, 
regardless of age (in comparison to the former system of 90 weeks for older workers). 
Additionally, the partaking in the labor market programs didn’t represent a prerequisite for 
unemployment insurance anymore. The guidelines for ‘punishing’ an individual without a job 
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and not undertaking active search measures were modified by Persson’s government in 2001. 
As such, the new arrangement contained minor sanctions, such as an assistance cut down of 
25 or 50% (ibid). In comparison to this, the forerunner government pursued somewhat 
punitive penalty for failure to search requirements eligibility, namely the total removal of 
assistances for a specific timeframe. The idea behind the new system sanctions was to enforce 
them on the more regular basis (ibid).  
The further striking reform of 2002 targeted the supplementary benefits hikes and the two-
tiered cap arrangement, grounded upon whether persons are occasional or regular applicants 
for unemployment insurance assistances. When the reform took place in on the 1st of July 
2002, it consisted of two major modifications. Firstly, the assistance upper limit for the initial 
20 weeks was outstretched by 7.4%, which was consistent with the upsurge of threshold 
incomes. Secondly, the ceiling was further raised by 17.2% for the periods greater than 20 
weeks (ibid). 
With the victory in 2006 election, the Conservative party, led by Fredrik Reinfield, took the 
office. The main idea, which attracted a vast share of party’s electorate was represented in 
election statement: “Fler i arbete - mer att dela på”, namely the more people in work - the 
more to share (Agius 2007:587).The government has, thus, claimed that some groups are 
excluded from the workforce and that the country requires changes towards approaching 
businesses. The notion behind such statement represented the danger of encouraging 
dependence on the welfare state that discouraged persons from producing their security 
through employment. In other words, Conservatives contended that individuals must work in 
order to maintain the welfare state (ibid). For this reason, the labor market reforms introduced 
by the government between 2007 and 2009 encompassed a shift towards unemployment 
assistances cut downs. They likewise included lower benefits ceilings, based on the three-
tiered replacement rate structure: 80 % during the first 200 days, 70 % after 201 and until 300 
days; and from day 301. In addition, the time spent in activation labor market programs 
weren’t considered as the time of redundancy. Other important modifications to the reform 
were: the upsurge of the waiting period (from 5 to 7 days), harsher admission requirements, 
reduction in subsidies to the unemployment insurance funds, ALMPs for the long-term 
unemployed, and the 65% replacement rates (Bennmarker 2011: 4-5; Bennmarker, Carling 
and Holmlund 2007:97-99; Lefresne 2010:23). 
The claim of Conservative government to preserve the welfare state, as well as the so-called 
Swedish model, not only took the social democratic line for managing affairs, but similarly 
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indicated a change from “the non-socialist bloc, which has been one of the welfare state’s 
most prominent critics” (Agius 2007:587). Indeed, one can claim that Swedish politics of the 
last decades has witnessed parties of both left and right shifting towards the center ground, 
where conservatives aimed more at the Swedish model implementation, whereas the Social 
Democratic party was more oriented towards market economy changes. According to Arndt, 
such transformations have permitted the Conservative party to achieve a position outside its 
ideological scope and, thus, electorate and “to compete with the Social Democrats at eye 
level, which had not been the case for decades” (2013:179). 
As a consequence, over the years covered by the study, the Social Democratic party in 
Sweden has indeed launched several welfare state reforms and reductions in unemployment 
insurance assistances (Allan and Scruggs 2004:505-510). Nevertheless, such measures can be 
seen as a response to the severe consequence of economic and financial crisis in Sweden 
during the 1990s. The party itself was aware of possible electorate reactions towards the 
undertaken measures, but the measures represented a necessity, not pure ideological positions 
of the party. Furthermore, the party reserved a more traditional position in the period of 
Persson’s government in the office. The so-called retrenchment changes were mostly short-
term and can be characterized as reasonable, as they were in line with the Social Democrats 
customary values of active labor market policies and workfare (Arndt 2013:179-182; 
Bennmarker, Carling and Holmlund 2007:86-92).  
 
5.1.3 Finland 
After the booming economic growth in 1980s, the historical events of welfare development 
have positioned Finland somewhere in the middle, with unemployment rates lower than in 
Denmark, but higher than in Sweden and Norway (Ploug 1999:80). As well as Sweden, 
Finland has faced serious economic constraints in 1990s, resulted by rocketing unemployment 
rates. Moreover, the collapse of Soviet Union affected in the intensification of the economic 
crisis and left the country to reconsider its social insurance provisions. As such, the 1990 
social democratic government was facing a number of bad decisions, also affected by the lack 
of counterbalancing strategies during the 1980s economic boom (Ploug 1999:80; Stephens 
1995:26). The decisions were mainly targeting the maintenance of a stable exchange rate, but 
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eventually devaluated the Finnish markka, causing a number of personal bankruptcies 
(Kananen 2014:142).  
The discussions on policy implementation at the beginning of 1990s were evolving around 
two contrasting opinions on the subject of Finland’s economic survival strategy and the 
maintenance of the welfare state. As such, the first belief, advocated by the mainstream of the 
Centre–Right government (in office between 1991 and 1995), stated that spending on social 
insurance must be cut. Furthermore, they suggested that the Finnish economy should be 
enhanced through minor expenditures rather than temporary reductions (Timonen 1999:257). 
The conflicting opinion, mainly encouraged by the leftist opposition and labor unions, 
underlined the importance of Keynesian demand administration as a prerequisite for the 
successful struggle against the economic downturn. The advocates of the approach blamed the 
Centre-Right government in “putting healthy state finance above citizens’ welfare and jobs” 
(ibid).  
The new Finnish Centre government pursued to narrow the admissibility criteria of income-
based unemployment assistance in 1994 (Kananen 2012:567). Before this unemployment 
policy reform, the uninsured job seekers could request the so-called ‘Basic Unemployment 
Insurance’ (peruspäiväraha) while an income-based support was accessible for the union 
member job seekers. The reform introduced a 500 days maximum duration period and a 
condition of a six-month work account for the ‘Basic Unemployment Insurance’, while those 
not eligible would be transferred to the new means-tested ‘Labor Market Support’ (ibid). 
Despite the predictions offered by institutional theories, the reaction to the cutback in 
employment benefits provision appeared somewhat beneficial for unions. Even though the 
leftist parties stood in opposition during the Aho government and the unemployment rates 
were mounting fast, the membership in unions has increased, and the struggle against 
unemployment benefits reductions was often efficient (Timonen 2003:32). As well as in 
Sweden, strong unions had the possibility to withstand harsh social insurance provision 
cutbacks. 
When Social Democrats (within the so-called Rainbow Coalition, encompassing the Left 
Alliance, the Conservative Coalition Party, the Swedish People’s Part and the Greens) entered 
the office in 1995, they carried out the reform aimed at restructuring income support and 
unemployment insurance policy, with the key principles of conducting the shift from passive 
to active policies (Kananen 2014:145; Sakslin and Keskitalo 2005:361). Such changeover 
from previous ideological claims of the left-wing parties represented a captivating 
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development. The development, thus, included a move from the Centre–Right government 
accusation of austerity that was destroying Finland’s economy and welfare to the rhetoric of 
accountability for the maintenance of the welfare state through the means of fair and 
reasonable restructuring (Timonen 1999:257). The reform offered by the new government, 
was carried out in form of so-called negative incentive, where the recipient is obliged to 
accept job offer or take on recruitment incentives in order not to lose a share of the assistance. 
Moreover, the reform was framed in such way that the benefit could not be withdrawn in the 
case where the withdrawal was unjust. Therefore, unlike Sweden and Denmark, Finland’s 
1995 reform didn’t directly influence the realm of rights and obligations (Salsklin and 
Keskitalo 2005:361). 
In 1997, the new Income Support Act was launched by the Social Democratic government, 
which outlined that requirements criteria for income-based redundancy assistance were 
constructed. The government claimed that structural modifications and cost-cutting measures 
were compulsory in order to safeguard the fundamental principles of the Finnish welfare state 
(Timonen 1999:257). At the same time, the Social Democratic party outlined that efficiency 
measures and the avoidance of redundant expenses as social spending must not exceed the 
economic performance of the country (ibid). Furthermore, the reason behind the 1997 
limitations was to prevent the eligibility renewal through involvement in activation methods. 
As a result, the eligibility criteria were further tightened to 10 months, which caused the 
devaluation of the coverage value since it imposed the two-year ceiling for duration period of 
income-based unemployment assistances (Kananen 2014:150). Due to such changes, a 
number of jobless persons had to become a subject to the means-tested benefits (ibid). The 
processes contrasted slightly in Denmark and Sweden, where the principle of coverage 
became only stronger with the actions undertaken by governments. The idea of insurance has 
contradictory debilitated in Finland with the consequence of labor market outsiders upsurge 
(ibid). It has consequently appeared that the Centre–Right and the Rainbow Coalition 
administration have implemented identical basic values of required economic policy. As such, 
both leftist, centrist and rightist parties which took part in the Aho and Lipponen 
administrations have recognized low inflation, public debt and budget deficit lessening as the 
most essential aims of economic and therefore benefit provision policies (ibid). The Social 
Democrats have frequently claimed that decreasing unemployment rates represented the issue 
of greatest importance, which paved the way for the introduction of employment incentives 
and the so-called negative incentive to work. 
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At the beginning of 2000s, the social democratic government have continued in the direction 
of reinforced sanctions and harsher employment guidelines. The authorized requirements on 
activation measures directing social benefits recipients were introduced in 2001 Act on 
Rehabilitative Work Activity (Aerschot 2011:33). They were intended as a supplement to the 
active labor market policies, which were already implemented, and their goal was to “apply 
activation measures to long-term unemployed recipients of either unemployment benefits or 
social assistance” (ibid). 
In order to simplify the assistance application procedures and norms, the unemployment 
coverage system in Finland was restructured shortly after in January 2003. The compensation 
pay scheme that had been in force until the end of 2002 was, thus, interrupted and the daily 
unemployment insurance payments had respectively risen to 150 days. This resulted in the 
overall upsurge in the everyday unemployment insurance payment by 15% while only the 
long-term out of work individuals were entitled to the higher insurance payments (Uusitalo 
and Verho 2010:643). 
As a response to the 2008 financial crisis, the Finish government established to extend the 
limitations in social assistance in regards to the recipients under 25 years of age (Kananen 
2012:570). The reform additionally reinforced the insider-outsider splitting up in the Finnish 
law, which was recognized as a partisan subject and was significantly greater than in Sweden 
and Denmark. These separations may as well impact working insiders’ options, specifically 
when they believe they can end up as outsiders group (ibid).  
To sum up, in the case of Finland, the local partisan and economic leaders were evidently 
concerned over the modifications that took place in the global arena, as well as Finland’s 
location within. The vast majority of political decision makers didn’t see other options to 
austerity that confidently would impact social and unemployment situation. Nevertheless, one 
can claim that the cutbacks in governmental spending posed a little threat to the fundamental 
structures of the welfare state in Finland. Moreover, the reduction of expenditure was 
implemented in such way, that it had no harm on the original model of unemployment 
services provision. As a consequence, in the period of severe economic crisis and the 
followed rising unemployment, Finish Social Democrats generated a number of reforms that 
are hardly connected to the notion of welfare retrenchment. It is rather the restructuring of the 
system to maintain welfare state, which still represents parties as an important strategic actor 
in policy decision making.   
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5.1.4 Norway 
Norway is an exceptional case within unemployment insurance in the Nordic model: it has 
introduced obligatory unemployment coverage while other states, making up social-
democratic welfare cluster, have reserved their voluntary coverage systems (Edling 2006:99). 
Moreover, the economic situation in Norway remained slightly different to other Nordic 
countries. Ever since the state could rely on the profits from its oil exports, which subsidize to 
large shares of GDP, Norway has skipped the pattern of the serious unemployment crisis, 
faced by other Scandinavian neighbors (Ploug 1999:99). Furthermore, it has also avoided the 
large welfare state cutbacks that took place in Sweden and Finland in 1990s, and earlier in 
Denmark (Stephens 1995:24; Bratberg and Vaage 2000:154). 
As such, when related to the majority of other OECD states, the Norwegian redundancy rates 
have occurred to be extremely insignificant during the 1980s, generally remaining between 
1.5 and 3% in 1988 (Bratberg and Vaage 2000:154). Subsequently, in 1989, the 
unemployment rates have suddenly risen and remained at roughly 5–6% of the labor force 
throughout the early 1990s (ibid). As already mentioned, Norway is the only representative of 
universal unemployment protection among Scandinavian countries, where all workers with 
minimum level incomes are covered. As such, the determined benefits duration accounted 80 
weeks, which were accompanied by 26 weeks without benefits until 1991 (ibid). An 
additional 80-week period could be granted for the further collection of unemployment 
insurance assistance. The means-tested social benefits represent an alternative option for 
unemployment insurance for those persons who did not succeed in obtaining a workplace 
(ibid).  
Once the Norwegian economy has crossed the threshold of the economic downturn in the 
period of early 1990s, the social democratic administration under Brundtland didn’t present 
any significant assistance reductions. In 1991, the social democratic government decreased 
the duration of the period without unemployment benefit by 13 weeks. In such way, the 
administration believed to impact the growing amount of long-term unemployed (Huo 
2009:211). Furthermore, the government put extra pressure on unemployment agencies to 
suggest a new workplace or a labor market program for a job seeker after 80 weeks. In case 
the requirements weren’t met, the assistances are no longer to be retreated for the following 
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13 weeks period (ibid). Moreover, between 1992 and 1993, the Social Democratic party 
additionally prolonged the duration of unemployment support up to 186 weeks (ibid). The 
reason behind such decision was similar to Swedish reasoning around increasing replacement 
rates, namely the faced pressure from labor unions concerned with longstanding redundancy.  
Interestingly enough, in comparison to other Scandinavian states, trade unions in Norway 
encompass less than 55% of manual workers (Huo 2009:57; Edling 2006:99). The numbers 
are relatively high when considering the fact that the Ghent system was abolished in 1938 in 
Norway, and the unemployment insurance has been controlled by the state (ibid). The 
corporatist nature of Norway means that the state principally functions as a negotiator 
between contrasting interests within the state. Not only the phenomenon explains the lower 
unionization rate in the country, but it also accounts for actions undertaken by Norwegian 
Labor Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti) during the 1990s. The minor degree of change in 
passive protection was considered to be more obvious in light of unemployment assistances in 
Norway as noncontributory and tax-funded. This type of funding simplifies the way 
government can affect changes in the system. As the assistances are not requested by 
employees as delayed wages, it becomes “less likely for collective action failure among 
unions to be an issue in impeding reforms” (Huo 2009:215).  
Nevertheless, though the social democratic administration continued to pursue the line of 
generous benefits stimulation, it has correspondingly enforced tougher requirements to work 
on those jobless. The requirements included constriction of the privileges to social security 
benefits. This case of the Norwegian Labor Party somewhat corresponds to the one of the 
Swedish Social Democrats. The party has reasonably restructured a new dialogue called 
‘work line’ (Arbeidslinje) as a reaction to rising unemployment (Arndt 2013:203; Huo 2009: 
70; Dahl & Drøpping 2001:273). The established strategy direction underlined the importance 
of activation labor market policies and narrowed the eligibility conditions and the duration of 
entitlements. Nevertheless, they didn’t represent either an essential contradiction to party’s 
ideological stances towards social policy or did they profoundly restrict or cut back the 
Norwegian welfare state (ibid). The Labor Party’s electorate share has been changing but 
remained in the scope of 35% in the time between 1989 and 2009, with the omission of 2001 
(Arndt 2013:203). At the time, it has merely achieved 24.3% of votes after a transitory shift as 
an ineffective minority government (ibid). Therefore, the example of the Norwegian Labor 
Party bears a close resemblance to the pattern outlined by its Swedish sister party. Namely, 
the restructurings appeared as reasonable, and they didn’t affect party’s popularity or the 
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long-lasting penalties but allowed the social democratic administration to ensure strong 
positions throughout the years. 
The quality of Norwegian employment policies remained relatively high throughout the 1990s 
period, but weakened to comparatively average level in 1997. The potential reason behind the 
change is predominantly the expanded proportion of young to overall unemployed (Kvist 
1999:245). As such, the situation of Norwegian restructuring must be understood with regards 
to state’s new highlighting on the above-mentioned ‘work line’. In accordance to the 
Arbeidslinje directives, the precedence is duty-bound to withstand redundancy and non-
employment through intensifying active labor market policies. Furthermore, ‘free-riders’ 
problem is addressed by forcing the supposed ‘passive’ distribution of cash assistances to 
conditionality, namely job or another type of activity acceptance. One can also trace a striking 
resemblance to the Danish ‘active line’ policies (ibid).  
In 2006, the Social Democrats under Jens Stoltenberg’s administration launched the reform of 
the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Organisation (NAV), which still characterizes one of the 
major public-sector transitions in the current history of Norway. The general purpose behind 
the reform represented the intensification in labor market participation and reconstructing the 
management towards more comprehensible, universal and effective. As for now, the NAV 
controls nearly one-third of Norway’s national budget (Lægreid and Rykkja 2013:4). At the 
central state level, the undertaken transformation combined the employment and domestic 
protection schemes into a new labor and welfare provision (ibid). For this reason, the NAV 
entailed further formal obligatory partnership between the central state and the local 
government administration. The general aims of the reform were the following. Firstly, it 
intended to upsurge the employed population and reduce the number of individuals exploiting 
social or welfare assistances, making up for the so-called work orientation route. The work 
orientation was planned to transfer individuals from the group of inert benefit recipients into 
employment, training or other work-related activities. Secondly, the NAV projected to 
contribute to services accessibility and adjustment towards residents’ demands, also known as 
user orientation plan. User orientation was designated as a way to provide users with greater 
impact on the way the services were shaped, and deliver facilities that were accustomed to the 
specific user. Thirdly, the reform aimed to establish a comprehensible and effectual 
management of employment and welfare provisions (ibid). More efficiency represented the 
linkage between the cost advantages and an anticipation that a sturdier management between 
the services would avert the overlap (ibid). 
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Until July 2008, Norwegian welfare state provided the ‘waiting benefit’, also known as 
ventestønad, which was targeting the long-term unemployed individuals (Duell, Singh and 
Tergeist 2009:73). The support was provided to those applicants who had previously been 
engaged in labor market activities for the minimum of three years throughout the past four 
years, and had exhausted the duration of assistance to unemployment insurance. It has 
aggregated to approximately two-thirds of preceding unemployment insurance assistances, 
but formally had no determined interval. Despite the fact that the assistance has been seen as a 
temporary measure for those anticipating for appropriate labor market activities or 
employment, a great number of applicants at no time entered active labor market policies or 
productive workplace. Instead, they endured to accept the assistances on a constant basis 
(ibid). As a consequence, the incentives to participate in the labor market or related activities 
appeared as particularly weak, the assistance was at the time withdrawn by the social 
democratic government (ibid).  
Having analyzed the provision of labor market policies in Norway, it is clear that the state has 
largely avoided any welfare cutback. Furthermore, there has been no substantial conversion in 
any form of social security, and it undoubtedly remained far from the residualist position, 
where the benefits must be delivered only when traditional means are unable to fulfil minimal 
necessities of life (Huo 2009:215). Instead of limiting unemployment support and its duration, 
the flourishing oil economy allowed Norwegian Labor Party to uphold further and even 
upsurge the welfare assistances. Furthermore, the party has also reinforced the work 
orientation of agendas, emphasized the importance of ALMPs, as well as applied targeting to 
direct assistances to the ones in need (ibid). Such development indicates that not only the 
Norwegian welfare state has been preserved, but also that strong Social Democratic party and 
high union density do matter when shaping and the welfare structure. 
 
5.2 Discussion 
As seen from the data analysis, some significant systematic changes within social insurance 
provision have occurred, which has put into question the initial solidness of the welfare state 
egalitarian properties, specifically in the area of unemployment insurance and employment 
incentives expenditures (Iversen 1998:72). Consequently, the premises of labor market 
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policies being path dependent are not pertinent, and thus contribute to H1 not being supported 
by this study. 
Furthermore, the study has found that countries of the social-democratic welfare cluster vary 
when it comes to labor market policies. As such, independently of parties in power, first 
Denmark, then the other Scandinavian states have executed a noticeable reduction in the 
average income replacement rates, duration, qualification, and coverage. Even though most of 
the reductions were introduced and enforced by Center-Right governments, not only have 
they been maintained by subsequent social democratic governments, but in some cases well 
promoted. Such results have therefore been counter-intuitive to the premises earlier expressed 
by power resource scholars, specifically that social democratic parties will pursue the fewest 
retrenchment policies they possibly can (Korpi 1985:39). Subsequently, H2 is not supported. 
As seen from the analysis section, most of the unemployment provision cutbacks have 
occurred as a response to severe economic challenges, even though the transformation of 
labor market policy has not been principally about economic saving in times of alleged 
austerity. Notably, the cutbacks were applied mostly to the passive benefits provision sector, 
whereas greater amounts of finance were introduced to stimulate employment incentives and 
ALMPs. Policies have, therefore, started to reflect elements of workforce policies, directed 
towards the supply-side of economics, but alternate to the neoliberal suggestions (Andersen 
2008:41). 
In regards to how changes in entitlements provision might be affected by partisan politics in 
each state, the thesis suggests that policies pursued by social democratic governments in 
universal welfare states cannot be completely assumed from the ‘new politics of the welfare 
state’ approach, offered by Paul Pierson. The Nixon-goes-to-China argument has limited 
power when applied to Denmark or Norway since both of the countries experienced growth of 
entitlement provision under the Social Democrats. Therefore, H3 is not supported by the 
study. 
Consequently, this study believes that when facing a number of economic constraints and 
related issues of unemployment growth, the parties in each state act in search for power. 
Therefore, both social democratic governments and their opponents pursue specific reform 
activity guided by vote-seeking perspective and use various strategies of either benefits 
retrenchment or expansion to appeal to the preferred electorate. The economic crises that hit 
Nordic countries in different decades were presumably instigated by macroeconomic 
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influences and the enduring financial shortages that unexpectedly occurred (Sigeman 
1999:278). And while it is often difficult or even unmanageable to validate a causal relation 
between numerous phenomena and their impact on the labor market policies, some 
undeniable support can be found for the H4, signifying a linkage between the negotiating 
power of the insiders and their unions and the reform activity of the parties in power. The 
expansion of the welfare state and related entitlements in the 1980s across Sweden and 
Norway (earlier in Denmark and Finland) has led to the increase of nominal salaries and thus 
resulted in inflationary tendencies, followed by currency devaluations and subsequent 
decrease in economy. Such a course of development, supported by reasonably high minimum 
incomes, contributed to a drastic increase in the number of unemployed outsiders, which in 
turn called for relevant reactions from the parties aiming for power.  
Thus, one can observe a decrease in unemployment insurance provision in Nordic states at 
times of preceding unemployment growth, also supported by the increase in spending on 
employment incentives. In Denmark and Finland, the introduced labor market policies were 
often supported by relatively important share of the population, specifically by the 
unemployed outsiders. Indeed, the generous unemployment insurance is believed to foster the 
unemployment growth either through the lack of job search motivation and the unwillingness 
to accept an offered employment or through the greater power of insiders. For Sweden not 
only the severe economic crisis became a point “of accepting the need of that overhaul of the 
unemployment insurance program into a drastically more activating direction”, but it has also 
opened a way for parties to attract new “affected by crisis” voters (Van den Berg 2008:12). 
Contrary to conventional ideas, which support political gridlock, this study believes that there 
might be a vote-seeking motivation behind undertaken labor market policies and reforms. 
Despite the fact that partisan compositions across states differ, as well as the goals and 
electoral schemes of numerous social democratic parties, each strive for attracting greater 
electorate support to maximize power through appealing to voters’ preferences. When Social 
Democrats push for retrenchment of unemployment benefits or maximize expenditure on 
employment incentives, as part of ALMPs, it is not due to the lack of options, but because 
they strategically choose to do so. 
5.3 Further remarks 
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Due to the different assumptions each theory of partisan politics has to offer, there is an 
excessive room to maneuver when interpreting to what extent the partisan shade of 
government affects the reform activity. Taking the various bits and pieces together, this study 
suggests following conclusions on the development of labor market policies in Nordic 
countries. Firstly, such policies are not path dependent. Secondly, politics matter. 
Nevertheless, to receive a clearer picture of the degree to which political parties influence the 
direction of welfare state development, their preferences and motivations behind pursuing a 
certain policy must be taken into account. Therefore, the study believes the scope should be 
extended, namely by including the latter aspects.     
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6 Conclusion 
The present study aimed to assess how the labor market policies in the countries belonging to 
social-democratic welfare regime have been reformed throughout the last 35 years, and how 
the politics of partisanship can explain such reform activity. Previous literature offered some 
insights of whether there is a retrenchment of social insurance and the role of various interest 
groups behind it. Nevertheless, the relation between reform activity and partisan composition 
haven’t been sufficiently analyzed in regards to cross-country temporal aspect, which lies in 
the heart of this thesis. 
The study utilized path dependency concept to assess whether its premises reflected the 
realities of the development of labor market policies within the Nordic model. Furthermore, 
theoretical claims of power resource, Nixon-goes-to-China, and insider-outsider frameworks 
constituted grounds to explore how the partisan shade of government affected reformation of 
labor market policies.    
To sum up, the results of the study show that labor market policies across Scandinavian states 
have undergone a number of changes, whereas the provision of unemployment insurance had 
decreased, the expenditure on employment incentives increased in various degrees, depending 
on what country was analyzed. The paper argues that the labor market reform activity that has 
taken place in countries belonging to social-democratic welfare regime is to be explained by 
vote-seeking strategy, rather than ideological preferences, pursued by parties. Furthermore, 
such reforms are uncovered by external factors, such as economic constraints and 
unemployment, which stimulate insider-outsider preferences dilemma, and thus push parties 
to undertake specific measures. 
 
6.1 Suggestion for further research 
Whereas the present paper primarily deals with labor market policies and the role of partisan 
composition behind their reformation, the study could be extended to the analysis of other 
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central facets, which lie in fundament of the Nordic model. The extension of the present 
research could shed light on how the delivery of welfare services as education, healthcare, and 
child-related services has changed since the Golden Age of the welfare state. Notably, that 
since all countries belonging to the social-democratic welfare state regime differ so much in 
their provision of entitlements and expenditures, one can put into question whether they can 
claim to form a distinct regime or whether the characteristics of the regime are outdated and 
need reconsideration. Thus, measuring how entitlement provisions affect decommodification 
and universalistic principles of Scandinavian states, as well as the role of the state, market and 
family behind welfare delivery represents a recommendation for further research. 
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